# Fem IR Supplement – BLV

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# \*\*\*NEG

## Links

### Geopolitics Link

#### The aff describes the opposition in tacitly gendered terms; the aff is inherently enforcing hegemonic masculinity

Costigliola ’97 – Frank, a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance”, Spring 1997, Oxford University Press, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/24913279.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:1d4dbe043a72071f54e4a04e33d89925&ab_segments=0/SYC-6451/test&origin=&acceptTC=1>

Kennan was only one of many U.S. officials who depicted the allies as partially incapacitated and needing direction, not just because the Europeans' military and economic power could not match America's but also because their rationality, health, or masculinity seemed in some way impaired. In many episodes of the Cold War, American officials juxtaposed images of the allies as effeminate, effete, or otherwise lacking in robust masculinity, with depictions of the Soviets as aggressively hypermasculine. Representing the danger as one of seduction and/or rape, U.S. officials expressed and reinforced gendered conceptions that naturalized America's predominance in the alliance. For example, at the 1954 Berlin Conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov made an appeal to French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Molotov argued that on the basis of Russia's and France's common trauma from German militarism in the world wars, the two nations should oppose the rebirth of the German military under the guise of the proposed European Defense Community. Moscow and Paris had much to cooperate about, Molotov stressed, and their "difference in social systems need not serve as [a] barrier between them." Recording this appeal, C. D. Jackson, a special assistant to President Dwight Eisenhower, wrote that Molotov "practically wooed Bidault in public." Jackson "slipped" Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston Merchant "a note saying 'I didn't think he would get his hand above Bidault's knee so soon.' " Jackson added that "Merchant laughed and left the note in front of him where it was solemnly read by JFD[ulles] a while later. He turned around and winked."" We get an insight into the power dynamics encoded in Jackson's language when we consider the effect of hypothetically switching the positions assigned to Bidault and to Dulles. If the Soviet minister had been appealing to U.S. interests, it would have seemed strange — and highly transgressive — for Jackson to represent that move as Molotov placing his hand above Dulles's knee. Yet Jackson's discourse assumed that taking liberties with the French was to be expected: the mock surprise was that Molotov would "get" to an intimate part of Bidault's body "so soon." A key point here is that Jackson's sexualizing of this political episode both drew on preexisting gendered stereotypes about French susceptibility and reinforced those stereotypes. Jackson's cheerful obscenity made the vulnerability and subordination of France seem natural and inevitable, grounded in the body and in emotion. Although it is unclear rrom the text, and perhaps was unclear to Jackson, whether Molotov's advance was to be coded as heterosexual or homosexual, in either case the French leader was positioned by jackson's discourse as passive and open to penetration. Merchant's laugh and Dulles's wink signaled that they got the point of Jackson's analogy. Moreover, the laugh and the wink marked a brief abatement in the formality and tension of the conference, a moment when the boys, including the usually straitlaced Dulles, bonded together on the basis of reinscribing the familia partly raping, partly seducing Soviets and the vulnerable French.

I should note that while the juxtaposition of Soviet power weakness suggested the metaphor of sexual overmastering, a com rape and seduction, another section of this document coded differently. In praising a speech in which Bidault had endorsed A on Germany and on the EDC, Jackson depicted him as "a hero" Jackson's language demonstrated, the governing logic or pattern metaphors is not that a person, nation, or policy is always masculine or feminine. Rather, writers or speakers generally code as masculine they understand to be positive, and they generally code as feminine they understand to be negative. In the context of the Atlantic alli policies, actions, or statements are generally those with which t agrees. An action by Bidault in accordance with U.S. purpos perceived them, was a masculine action, requiring "guts" and ev the other hand, an action suggesting that the French were incli Soviet policy — or acting independently — was somewhat parad as an effeminate non-action, a position of passive, sexualized Molotov had his hand above Bidault's knee. Through this con ments of rape and seduction in an overarching metaphor, Bidault agency and knowledge: He is both overpowered and duped.

This gendered interpretation of Bidault's interaction with Mo pattern in which U.S. officials represented France's resistanc policy as evidence that Fourth Republic France suffered from me from an insufficiency of masculinity, and from a moral corruptio and society. In order to explore how these categories of deficienc and reinforced one another, we need first to discuss the operati oppositions in the language of foreign policymakers and analyst It is common Western usage of language to construct meaning izing things in terms of pairs that require one item to be not just dis negation of the other. In other words, we tend to organize and according to what they are not or to what they are opposed. The most basic binary opposition is between the self and the rest of the world: There is me and not-me and, by an easy extension, us and not-us. In the case of the very different or alien, there is same and the other. When the French resisted American aims for the Atlantic alliance, U.S. officials often reacted with emotive language that drew much of its force from such binary oppositions as self/other, we/them, healthy/sick, sane/crazy, masculine/feminine, rational/emotional, logical/illogical, moral/cor rupt, disciplined /uncontrolled, sound / foolish, civic / selfish, trustworthy/unreli able, good/wicked, active/passive, objective/subjective

These binary oppositions help shape meaning, both in discussions of foreign policy and in more general discourse. The first term in each binary set is more highly valued by society, usually by both women and men. Because the terms in each of the pairs are mutually exclusive, binaries help accentuate differences, thereby underplaying the possibility of an intermediate position between the opposites. For example, if descriptive language codes French policy as a manifestation of sickness and codes American policy as a manifestation of health, such language undermines the view that each policy is the expression of legitimate, though different, national interests. The organization of these binaries encourages people to assume linkages and spillovers within the set of positive terms - such as self, healthy, sane, sound, rational, logical, objective, and masculine from the above list — and comparable links within the set of negative terms, such as other, sick, crazy, foolish, emotional, illogical, subjective, and feminine.1'

Because people conventionally assume that the differences between masculine and feminine are basic and natural, spoken or written language often maps these perceived differences onto other oppositions, such as rational/emotional and objective/subjective. Since at least the time of Aristotle, both men have commonly - though not universally - assumed that men were more rational and objective and that women by nature susceptible to illness and folly.'4 nd folly.'4 It is important to note that when I use "masculine" or "feminine" I am not talking about the behavior of sp men and women but rather the conventional, hegemonic view of m and femininity that tells us how men and women should, and supp behave. Although powerful, discourses about the masculine and the do not necessarily correspond to the behavior of actual people; furth woman may act or talk "like a man," and a man may act or talk “like a woman”

### Great Power War Link

#### Aff positions great powers as a dangerous alien threat, which perpetuates neo-realist method that deems all violence acceptable as long as large nations are in harmony. Focus is on escalation rather than prevention. Turns case, aff thinks of other nations as enemies first — root cause of all violence. Alt solves — feminist conflict resolution rejects war as a means for peace.

Scheyer and Kumskova 19 (Victoria and Marina, graduating from Master’s degree Studies at the University for Peace mandated by the United Nations, Master degree in Human Rights from Columbia University, “FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: A FINE LINE BETWEEN “ADDING WOMEN” AND PURSUING A FEMINIST AGENDA”, 2019, Journal of International Affairs Vol.72 No.2 Spring/Summer, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760832>, pd)

The proliferation of feminist foreign policies has become a sign of commitment to another world order. Governments that adopt such action envision a world where women’s rights are equally important to those of men. They commit to empowering women and ensuring their meaningful participation across various issues. Such commitments, therefore, are understood as the objectives of a feminist foreign policy. This article explains that, while a commitment to women’s rights is important, the current practices of purportedly feminist foreign policies do not reflect an authentically feminist approach. We look into the theoretical background of feminist analysis in international relations, propose criteria for a feminist foreign policy based on feminist theory, and use these criteria to analyze and conduct gap analysis of existing feminist foreign policies. Overall, this study helps unpack the definition of feminist foreign policy and highlight areas that can be addressed by those willing to commit to redefining security and peace in the current world order. The state of the current world order depends on the lens through which one looks at it. While some suggest that gender considerations are starting to play a bigger role in international relations, others claim that gender analysis continues to be ignored and even pushed back against.1,2,3 While politicians paint either one of these pictures, there is a general consensus about the situation on the ground: In many places, the principles of democracy and multilateralism are being questioned, the rights of women, queer, indigenous, and rural groups, among others, are threatened, and conflicts are becoming more complex and are extending beyond the borders of states and regions. Mostly, the current world system still operates in a neo-realist way, in which states try to operate according to the principle of sovereignty and competition for world power.4 As the recent 2019 Munich Security Conference demonstrated, the worldwide increase of military and defense budgets, especially in the United States, China, and Russia, and the growing tensions between these states, indicate the rising competition for power.5 At such conferences, the idea of incorporating gender analysis or some feminist principles is artificial. Fortunately, there are a number of states that care to some degree about the principle of “We The People” enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the way social groups and members of the international community fit into the current world order. The last few years have also shown that the number of such states is increasing, supposedly in response to the ongoing failure of the “superpowers” to address violence and crises of their own making. At the same time, states that were peripheral to the establishment of the United Nations now act as megaphones of multilateralism, promoting the ethical norm of equal treatment among states and empowering each other in the process.6 One example of this is the multilateral action to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, in which states have united not around the principle of power but on the principle of opposing the security scheme that has not been working for everyone. The process showed the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons, and think of themselves as the world’s superpowers, that there is another means to security, one based on the principles of multilateralism, common morality, human rights, and extraterritorial accountability.7 In some scholarship, states that promote human rights and multilateralism are known as “good states.”8 Good states are those that use foreign policies to improve global justice beyond their borders and transform global politics through the pursuit of good international citizenship, which requires sensitivity to the needs and wants of “others.” The states that take on a similar view on global politics and their responsibility on the global scale rely on an alternative vision of global politics, looking at the drivers of conflict and the root causes of violence in communities, societies, and institutions. Feminist analysis represents another component of an alternative view on global politics, not an idealistic departure from it. This analysis provides a welldefined and augmented alternative to the neo-realistic framework. All three of the 2015 United Nations Reviews have admitted that the absence of gender analysis is a key challenge for peace.9 Feminist foreign policy is one that includes whole populations, appreciates diversity, inspires comprehensive analysis, and leaves no one behind. This article explains that striving toward a feminist foreign policy and having one are not the same. We look into the theoretical background of feminist analysis in international relations, propose criteria for a new understanding of feminist foreign policy, and apply these criteria to analyze and conduct a gap analysis of existing feminist foreign policies. Overall, this study helps unpack the definition of feminist foreign policy and highlight areas that can be addressed by those willing to redefine security and peace in the current world order. Theoretical Background: What is a Feminist Foreighn Policy? Traditional international relations theory defines foreign policy as both the relationships between states and the structural organization of a government and its foreign affairs.10 Currently, states’ relationships and governing systems are structured through a neo-realist method: These relationships and systems are organized hierarchically and situated within a security dilemma; they serve national interests; and they are based on the principle of sovereignty.11 With a few exceptions, the top ranks of these hierarchies are occupied by men and generally dominated by masculine principles. This is often overlooked because “gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present.”12 This represents what is referred to as “patriarchy.” Feminist Critique Of Traditional Approaches To Security Patriarchal systems and practices in foreign policy are highly criticized by feminist international relations theory.13 The foundational basis of this theory is that “gender is an integral, not an accidental, feature of the worldwide structure of diplomatic, military and economic relations.”14 As Acker claims, the feminist method is not about adding women into the system but revealing how the concept of gender is incorporated into it.15 Such a method shows that current principles of foreign policy are highly dependent on gender norms, roles, and structures, and that all institutions are inherently gendered.16 Acker asserts that gender in institutions could be understood in two ways: either as a gender-neutral structure that tries to adjust women to the existing systems of power and applies principles of representational gender equality or as gender-integrated structures that apply equality and justice within the structures, norms, and ruling ideology.17 Acker agrees with the second understanding and claims that gender is an integral part of all structures.18 For us, therefore, a feminist foreign policy requires rethinking and re-envisioning gender structures of institutions and governance systems. It cannot be equivalent to a foreign policy that merely aims to ensure equal representation or meaningful participation of women in the position of power. Using Gender Analysis True, Tickner, and Enloe deconstructed the main concepts of foreign policy and international relations using gender analysis.19, 20, 21 They revealed the gender bias of security, power, and sovereignty, claiming that these concepts are made by and for men on the basis of their experiences.22 Hence, the concept of hegemonic masculinity was established to describe gendered power distribution in hierarchies. Hegemonic masculinity is understood as a “culturally idealized form” of power, mainstreamed in personal, collective, and institutional spheres of life, and expressed through hierarchy, violence, and aggression.23 Hegemonic masculinity expresses an unequal gender structure, which should be challenged by integrating feminist principles into national and foreign policy.24 Understanding Feminist Foreign Policy What does feminist foreign policy look like? Indeed, there is no agreed upon definition of a feminist foreign policy. What we have learned from feminist theory is that gender parity and attempts to make women visible in international relations are not enough to realize a comprehensive feminist foreign policy. Such an approach, according to Enloe, only implies an attempt to embed women firmly inside a patriarchal system and fails to challenge the underlying gender norms that fuel violence and conflict.25 The claim that gender parity in foreign policy will also bring about more peace and harmony in international relations is not as effective as women’s meaningful participation achieved through structural change.26 The study by UN Women and Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative shows that, despite the fact that women’s inclusion improves opportunities for peace, the number of women present at the negotiating table does not assure a better outcome for women: “it is the level of influence that women can assert on the process that makes a difference, not only their presence by numbers.”27 In her book Bananas, Beaches, Bases, Enloe provides deep insights into how women from diverse backgrounds play an important role in international politics but are systematically excluded, ignored, and often forgotten.28 When analyzing the qualities and characteristics embodied by those in power, one will find a surprisingly homogenous group of world leaders in economics and politics. However, it is also the case that there exist female members of parliament who vote for military conflict solutions or uphold the patriarchal militarized system; they also serve as leaders of major military institutions.29 These are the manifestations of the traditional neo-realist security system, and its comparatively easy application drives both women and men into making decisions and setting their priorities.30 The feminist approach to foreign policy is not as easy; it demands a shift in how individuals within the system make political decisions and set priorities. It is about advancing peace and development for everyone, not through striving for the absence of conflict or serving the interests of individuals within the government, but through reimagining governance and social structures, as well as promoting nonviolent conflict solutions. We propose that the guiding principles for a feminist foreign policy framework should include intersectional analysis and inclusion, complete disarmament, security concepts centered around the wellbeing and safety of the individual, the inclusion of civil society, the promotion of international solidarity through dialogue, and the fostering of communities based on empathy. Indicators Of A Feminist Foreign Policy The guiding principles of feminist foreign policy can be practically visualized through the following set of indicators: political dialogue, feminist political economy, individual safety and wellbeing, empathic communities, inclusivity, and a gender analysis based on intersectionality. The following section elaborates our assumptions about what feminist foreign policy should look like based on the feminist international relations theory. Political Dialogue Political dialogue should be the basis of all aspects of foreign policy, including diplomacy, trade, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution. Unfortunately, practitioners in the field of international relations continue to emphasize militarized or forced solutions to the world’s security problems and trade politics. Feminist scholars criticize this approach and start their analysis with the question “where are the women?” and end by highlighting the need for a shift of the entire approach of security and militarism toward an inclusive dialogue.31 Feminist conflict resolution approaches reject war as a means to peace, viewing war as a result of institutionalized violence and a battle for power over the counterpart.32 Feminist scholars seek to prevent violence and identify root causes of conflict.33 Addressing the drivers of conflict instead of superficially fighting the symptoms, such as physical violence, differentiates military security from feminist approaches focused on safety and wellbeing. Feminist conflict resolution starts with a gender analysis of power, the inclusion of marginalized voices and local people through dialogue, and the commitment to disarmament.34 Safety and Wellbeing In traditional foreign policy approaches, security is given high priority. Concepts such as national or human security represent understandings of governments on what to target or how to achieve security. Feminists have criticized both concepts because these approaches ignore or overlook the gendered dimension of security.35 Feminist security studies emphasize and elaborate the importance of asking questions such as “security for who, by whom?”36 It is the questioning of the militarized security that is not able to protect women, children, civilians, migrants, among others, neither in times of conflict nor in times of peace.37 Feminist security studies emphasize the need to rethink traditional concepts of security. Putting the security issues of all intersectional groups and individuals at the center of security, the usefulness of the military industrial complex will have to be questioned.38 Buying tanks or fighter jets are not preventing children from dying of hunger, stopping preventable diseases from spreading, or averting genderbased violence. Instead, this form of security often perpetuates these situations.39 In an ever-changing society featuring dynamically evolving conflicts, Sylvester emphasizes that there is a need to always review, reframe, and reflect on current approaches of security and avoid the formulation of universal, timeless, and fixed security concepts.40 With this in mind, we refrain from unpacking the concept of security, and we support feminist ideas of shifting the focus from security toward the peace, safety, and wellbeing of the gendered individual. Wellbeing, in this vein, includes physical safety in addition to the social and political security of people and the fulfillment of basic social needs. We argue that the way problems are framed inherently influences the way solutions are found. While defining security not through the absence of violence but through the foundations of peace, world leaders can commit to peace through, for example, renaming the United Nations Security Council into the United Nations Peace Council. Feminist Foreign Policy demands shifting toward a positive peace model and away from security. Empathic Communities The third indicator we have identified is based on the building of empathic communities. We differentiate between alliances based on military or defense strategies and communities based on empathy and friendship. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or even the current structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), serve the goal of engaging in alliances to advance militarized security and national interests. These coalitions further capitalize on the fundamental values of neo-realism in international politics and represent the hegemonic security model. Because these alliances always come with implicit assumptions such as the presence of an enemy, a threat, and power conflict, violent escalation often proves inevitable. Feminism claims that there are more reasons for building communities, which are not about military and power, but rather about common goals such as peace, mutually beneficial trade agreements, or agreements on disarmament. Those can eventually build trust and dependencies so that attacks and war would seem illogical. Communities such as the Group of Friends of 1325, the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, and Friends of Gender Parity are built on agreements that open dialogue builds trust and empathy. Inclusion and Intersectional Approach While there is not yet diverse and inclusive representation of the heterogeneous society we live in, civil society groups, grassroots organizations, and local organizations offer key forums through which diverse experiences can be integrated in international relations. Feminist foreign policy needs to identify these forums and include these actors in policy making. This could be achieved through making space for gender lobbyism, regularly hearing and consulting with civil society, reaching out to grassroots and local organizations and refraining from supporting traditional hierarchical structures through a reference to a “bottom-up” approach, which is inherently hierarchical. Gender Analysis Feminist methodology as the overarching umbrella of all indicators represents a critical examination of power. Foreign policy and international relations are an amphitheater for power relations, and gender analysis represents a tool to change the script. Asking questions such as “who is involved?,” “why are certain decisions made?,” “who is affected?,” and “who controls resources?” represents the shared practice of feminist gender analysis, which aims to reveal underlying power relations and to deconstruct the discrimination, silencing, and marginalization of groups that do not fit existing gendered identities.41 Gender analysis reveals what is behind social and political norms and assists in providing alternative solutions. Moreover, it elucidates the experiences of different groups of people, which can help detect root causes of inequality as a starting point of correcting discriminatory policies and laws.42 As discussed above, a gender analysis needs to be applied to existing security concepts, military alliances, and militarism. Gender analysis is crucial to understand why people lack access to resources, why some communities are more prone to violence, or how policies affect different groups of people. Gender analysis, hence, is a basic tool and methodology for a feminist foreign policy. What Is “Feminist” In Current Foreign Policies? A small number of countries have already announced their adoption of feminist policies and programs within their foreign policy frameworks. With the announcement of its feminist foreign policy in 2014, Sweden is seen as the pioneer of feminist foreign policy and a norm-setter on how gender matters in international relations.43 Gender equality has also been featured prominently in some parts of British foreign policy since 2009, and the UK International Development (Gender Equality) Act adopted in 2014.44,45 Between 2011 and 2015, the Australian government also made a commitment to global gender equality and women’s empowerment as a core foreign policy goal.46 Following these examples, Canada’s government announced its adoption of feminist international assistance policies.47 In February 2016, Australia adopted a comprehensive foreign policy gender strategy.48 Similarly, Norway adopted a gender strategy within its foreign policy in October 2016.49 The latest addition to the list is Germany, which promised to take the issue of women, peace, and security seriously in its 2019-2020 tenure in the UN Security Council, and it has important political leaders, including Stefan Liebich of Die Linke and the Green Party, pushing for slightly varied definitions of a feminist foreign policy.50,51 Many of these policies are focusing disproportionately on the rights and experiences of women. If having a focus on women’s empowerment is what constitutes a feminist foreign policy, then the United States qualifies, too. The State Department, under Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, crafted a collection of issue-specific foreign policies on various gender issues, including the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, and a Global Strategy to Empower Adolescent Girls.52 Feminist scholars and activists have many issues with calling any of the above-mentioned policies “feminist.” First, these policies are often criticized for being inconsistent in the feminist approach to international relations. Second, in many situations, gender considerations are not being put at the center of all of the foreign policy decisions that these countries undertake. Lastly, every single policy from this list focuses disproportionately on the situation of women, their rights, and needs, instead of addressing gendered power structures, identifying silenced groups, building empathic communities, and rethinking important concepts, such as sovereignty, militarism, and nationalism. Sweden’s “Handbook on Feminist Foreign Policy,” for example, defines a feminist foreign policy as a transformative agenda that aims to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors.”53 In theory, feminist foreign policy should be about looking into the structures, addressing gendered power relations, building gender inclusive institutions and pursuing policies that incorporate the interests of and seek to benefit all. Our analysis of the nature and implementation of existing feminist foreign policies revealed the following key gaps, thus challenging the “feminist” label given to them. The Political Economy Of War The traditional approach to security supports the idea that international conflict is best solved through war and violence.54 One goal of feminist foreign policy should be to change this ideology and advance security based on individuals’ wellbeing, disarmament, and political dialogue. Militarism, Enloe claims, is both ideology and worldview: having enemies is a natural situation, that violence is a part of human nature, and that the masculine needs to protect the feminine. The military and the military-industrial complex are known to marginalize femininity, which is seen as a weakness. In this vein, the military-industrial complex exists to show the prevalence of some over others, to defeat what is seen as a weakness by what is perceived as power. Therefore, by simply addressing the situation of women, feminist foreign policies would not be able to achieve what feminism stands for, which is re-envisioning security through the understanding of power and the masculinity-femininity nexus. However, it is well known that a source of income for many governments is its arms trade and the mining of “conflict minerals,” such as wolframite and cobalt.55 This list includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and many others. All of these countries are engaged in the political economy of war—the context in which the relationship between production, labor, trade, law, policy, and the distribution of national income are gender-blind and militarized.56 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) conducted a series of studies exposing the impact of arms transfers from Sweden and the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia on the lives of women in Yemen.57 Similarly, WILPF also exposed how the production and mining of minerals by Canada, for example, clearly prioritizes systems of monetary profit over citizens’ human rights and governmental accountability.58 Women, in this context, are negatively and disproportionally affected. For example, gender-based violence in the mining industry is often disproportionately connected to the socioeconomic conditions in which women find themselves.59 Women are forced to work in the mines as cooks and cleaners because of the absence of jobs available to them, and the militarized atmosphere at mining sites often negatively impacts the way women are treated. Therefore, countries that claim to be pursuing feminist foreign policies are not making sincere efforts to reimagine governance and security, instead contributing to the escalation of violence and the promotion of a masculine military ideology. One rare exception is the Government of Costa Rica, which, while not having yet adopted a feminist foreign policy framework, has made great strides in reallocating its entire government defense budget to health and public services.60 In the majority of countries, however, a feminist foreign policy becomes nothing more than a label. The policies that states choose to roll out cannot be separated from the lived and highly gendered experiences of conflict, and from the new and often more complex and overlapping needs that emerge as a result of that conflict. Heteronormativity And Exclusion The concept of heteronormativity refers to the constructed norm of heterosexuality in society, and the concomitant notion that other gender identities are deviant or “abnormal.”61 The problem lies in the fact that a certain set of norms and rules determine the domination of one gender over another, including deciding over identity groups and having different rights and social recognition, a situation that highly influences the way policymaking is carried out. Some of the gender analysis toolkits across various fields assessed for this research are based on the binary definition of gender.62 In this system, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender, and queer identities have been excluded from the political sphere through discrimination in law and in practice.63 Laws exert significant control over sexuality, marriage, and identity, and are also used to maintain the current distribution of power in the international system. These social norms are also reflected in institutions and organizations, the majority of which are set up according to specific gender norms. Connell calls this phenomenon “the gender regime of an institution” and claims that it creates an enabling environment for exclusion.64 The complaint brought in 2014 by W.H. v. Sweden at the European Court of Human Rights shows how far the gendered regime of an institution can go. W.H., who applied for asylum because she tried to escape a forced marriage in Iraq, was determined as not having a plausible case for a refugee status in Sweden. The Migration Board of Sweden noted that she would not lack a “male network” to protect her in Iraq because her brother had also been refused asylum in Sweden.65 The European Court has upheld Sweden’s decision to reject the applicant’s application for asylum. This is but one example of how institutions of law can be highly gendered. At the same time, Germany, which has yet to develop a feminist foreign policy, has demonstrated first steps towards challenging gender-blind governance by, among other initiatives, opening a series of investigations into gender-based violence crimes committed by ISIS against Yazidi women.66 In this regard, Belgium has also made great strides. The Belgian justice system exercises what is known as “universal jurisprudence,” allowing its national courts to prosecute anyone who has committed genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity anywhere in the world.67 Although other countries have similar laws, Belgium’s are particularly broad, and its judges are unusually willing to use them.68 A feminist foreign policy or a policy guided by a feminist approach should start with a gender analysis that addresses gender norms, roles and relations through the inclusion of marginalized voices and experiences into institutions and sectors such as health, education, and security, among others. Security In the neorealist worldview, national security and sovereignty, the protection of borders, and the control of trade represent core security concerns. This security is often provided through standby military defense mechanisms and migration laws. While this concept seems to fail protecting people from violence and the impact of wars, feminist scholars have raised questions concerning who are the main beneficiaries of traditional security frameworks and what groups are excluded.69 Having revealed the focus on upholding sovereign power structures and state systems, feminist security studies claim that to understand security, one needs to understand power, which itself is gendered.70 Shepherd demands a shift toward security for the individual, including stateless people and migrants and the development of comprehensive positive models for peace rather than security.71 Australia, one country that faces major gender security issues related to border control and immigration detention, is one example where the concept of security has yet to be transformed through a foreign policy gender strategy. True argues that government actors in Australia have interpreted the state’s responsibility to prevent violence and protect against gender-specific crimes, primarily in relation to military, diplomatic, peace-building, and aid presences, “outside” Australian borders in conflict-affected and post-conflict states.72 They have not recognized the responsibility to include non-citizens inside or outside Australian borders who have fled conflict zones and gender-based oppression. In this context, Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-18, which focuses on women’s protection and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, does not have a mandate to incorporate the protection of women and their dependents fleeing conflict zones or gender oppression and crossing Australian borders as irregular migrants or asylum-seekers.73 At the same time, Germany has made the safety of women and children refugees a priority.74 There are various programs that help refugee women obtain skills and employment, integrate within communities, and get necessary support.75,76,77 Similarly, Jordan continues to demonstrate humanitarian leadership in the Syrian refugee crisis, providing multi-sectoral services that build women’s resilience and empowerment in the support of UN Women.78 In a feminist foreign policy, the wellbeing of a population needs to be the biggest concern of a state. A feminist method, therefore, demands that the norms of women’s rights and international law be strengthened and that the focus be shifted from escalation to prevention. This implies a conceptual reorientation from a narrowly defined security policy to a comprehensive gender-responsive policy. Sovereignty And Hierarchy The logic of militarism, security, and hegemonic masculinity implies a closed hierarchical organizational and social structure. This structure distributes power to specific groups or individuals, with others submitting to it.79 Hierarchy is only one out of many forms of organization, but it is often presented as the most effective and logical one. Former civilizations even called hierarchy the “holy structure.”80 Sovereignty, in this vein, is what sustains hierarchy. As a term that came about with the Treaty of Westphalia and capitalized its importance with the signing of the United Nations Charter, it is often used as the ultimate claim to authority both domestically and internationally.81 Hierarchy and the monopoly on authority are the core characteristics of hegemonic masculinity.82 By maintaining the principles of sovereignty, masculinity is upheld through multilateral agreements such as the United Nations Charter and the creation of a common identity referred to as nationalism.83 These principles further maintain hierarchy. When we analyze the structure of the United Nations, the hierarchical structure is clearly visible in the organization of the United Nations Security Council, where the five permanent members have the privilege of the veto and the nonpermanent members are subordinate.84 Furthermore, the international peace model is oriented around the hegemonic peace theory, in which a hegemon retains disproportionate power over resources and armaments to deter conflict.85 However, there are several states that are willing to subject themselves to international accountability to build partnerships for peace. The EU Common Position on Arms Exports requires an export license to be denied if, among other things, there is a clear risk that the equipment to be exported might be used for violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.86 This signals a very important attempt to commit to protecting human rights and preventing sexual and genderbased violence at the expense of potentially having their sovereignty subjected to questioning.87 Overcoming hierarchical and sovereign structures requires a commitment to be part of the collective process of determining how governments can create a more sustainable and just world based on empathy. Governments must be committed to a long-term vision, but they must also be flexible with the initiatives they pursue, understanding that all strategies will be subject to constant change as they strive together for a more just world. Conclusion A comprehensive feminist foreign policy remains a theoretical aspiration. In theory, feminist foreign policy aims to address gender power structures and reframe traditional concepts of security and peace, sovereignty, sexuality, governance, and nation-building. Despite criticism, feminism is not a utopian concept. It is an alternative explanation of the international system and guidance for how it can be restructured to prevent a constant state of securitization and crisis. A feminist foreign policy can build a peaceful international state system based on community-building, inclusion, gender analysis, and political dialogue. Feminism will stand on the margins of current foreign policy debates for a long time if governments continue to pursue power by traditional means and only attempt to embed women into the system rather than adopting a comprehensive feminist policy. The current examples of feminist foreign policies are often seen as gender binary, and the concept of a feminist foreign policy is operationally misunderstood. The current implementation of feminist foreign policies is yet to follow the feminist approach as it is seen by key academics in this field. Such policies focus on putting more women in decision-making positions and bringing more support to women’s rights and needs, while leaving behind numerous intersectional groups of people, references to whom are rarely included in foreign policy due to its gendered nature. At the same time, even women’s rights are not necessarily fully integrated into feminist foreign policies because governments often differ in their understanding of whose women’s rights they are protecting. They are generally less concerned about the impact of arms trade on women’s rights or security, as the government may not be directly involved in the conflict. In other cases, governments only worry about women who are nationals of their state or women who are located outside of the state, therefore once again leaving a large group of refugees, stateless individuals, and migrants vulnerable to violence and discrimination. For us, the feminist approach to foreign policy demands a shift in how states make political decisions and set priorities. It is about reaching for sustainable and inclusive peace and development for everyone—not striving for the mere absence of conflict but reimagining governance, especially social and governmental structures. The following key indicators can serve as a baseline for a feminist foreign policy: gender analysis; safety and wellbeing; peaceful models of conduct through a political dialogue; community-building based on empathy and common goals, and inclusive policymaking by integrating intersectional approaches. Gender analysis is required to respond to gender inequalities by addressing gender norms, roles, and relationships, and to thereby drive reform of governance and state institutions. Through partnerships, governments can operationalize nonheteronormative visions of organization in foreign policy. The current approach to feminist foreign policy has no capacity to challenge political economies of war, exclusion, militarized security, sovereignty, and hierarchy. The focus remains on increasing gender equality through representation, leaving no commitment for structural change. In this way, the current world order manages to deflect feminist challenges to the existing order without altering the dominant neorealist structures. Without changes—and, as we have shown, there are indications that some change is underway—this approach threatens to make a feminist approach another short-term and artificial solution that is unlikely to lift the world out of its current crisis.

### Food Security Link (Long)

#### Women are the foundation of food security, patriarchal economics deny women their innovation towards agricultural biodiversity in their conquest to masculinize agriculture

**Shiva 09’** [Vandana Shiva, Indian scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist and anti-globalisation author, “Women and the Gendered Politics of Food” in Philosophical Topics Volume 37, Issue 2, Fall 2009 Global Gender Justice, pg. 17-32]

Agriculture, the growing of food, is both the most important source of livelihood for the majority of the world people, especially women, as well as the sector related to the most fundamental economic right, the right to food and nutrition. Women were the world's original food producers, and they continue to be cen- tral to food production system in the Third- World countries in terms of the work they do in the food chain. The worldwide destruction of the feminine knowledge of agriculture evolved over four to five thousand years, but a handful of **white male scientists** in less than two decades have not merely **violated women as experts**; but since their expertise in agriculture has been related to modeling agriculture on nature's methods of renewablility, its destruction has also gone hand in hand with the ecological destruction of nature's processes and the economic destruction of the poorer people in rural areas. Agriculture has been evolved by women. Most farmers of the world are women, and most girls are future farmers. Girls learn the skills and knowledge of farming in the fields and farms. What is grown on farms determines whose livelihoods are secured, what is eaten, how much is eaten, and by whom it is eaten. **Women make the most significant contribution to food security**. They produce more than half the world's food. They provide more than 80 percent of the food needs of food-insecure household and regions. **Food security is** therefore **directly linked to women's food-producing capacity**. Constraints on women's capacity leads to erosion of food security, especially for poor households in poor regions. From field to kitchen, from seed to food, women's strength is diversity. Women's capacities are eroded when this diversity is eroded. Diversity is the pattern of women's work, the pattern of women's planting and sowing of food crops and the pattern of women's food processing. The dominant systems of economics, science, and technology have conspired against women and girls by conspiring against diversity. Economics has rendered women's work as food providers invisible because women provide for the household and perform multiple tasks involving diverse skills. Women have remained invisible as farmers in spite of their contribution to farming. People fail to see the work that women do in agriculture.. Their produc- tion tends not to be recorded by economists as "work." And agriculture as a future vocation for girls is thus closed. These problems of data collection on agricultural work arise not because too few women work but **too many women do too much work**. There is a conceptual inability of statisticians and researchers to define women's work inside the house and outside the house (and farming is usually part of both). This recognition of what is and is not labor is exacerbated both by the great volume of work that women do and the fact that they do many chores at the same time. It is also related to the fact that although women work to sustain their families and communities, most of their work is not measured in wages. Science and technology have rendered women's knowledge and productivity invisible by ignoring the dimension of diversity in agricultural production. As the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on Women Feed the World men- tions, women use more plant diversity, both cultivated and uncultivated, than agri- cultural scientists know about. In Nigerian home gardens, women plant 18-57 plant species. In Sub-Saharan Africa women cultivate as many as 120 different plants in the species left alongside the cash crops managed by man. In Guatemala, home gardens of less than 0. 1 half acre have more than ten tree and crop species.4 In a single African home garden more than 60 species of food-producing trees were counted. In Thailand, researchers found 230 plant species in home gardens. In Indian agriculture women use 150 different species of plants for vegetables, and health care. In West Bengal 124 "weed" species collected from rice fields have economic importance for farmers. In the Expana region of Veracruz, Mexico, peasants utilize about 435 wild plant and animal species of which 229 are eaten. Women are the biodiversity experts of the world. Unfortunately, girls are being denied their potential as food producers and biodiversity experts under the dual pressure of invisibility and domination of industrial agriculture.5 While women manage and produce diversity, the dominant paradigm of agri- culture promotes monoculture on the false assumption that monocultures produce more. Monocultures do not produce more, they control more. As FAO's World Food Day report, a study in eastern Nigeria found occupying only 2 percent of a household farmland accounted for h total output. Navdanya's studies on biodiversity-based ecologica that **women-run farms produce more food and nutrition than in farms**.6 Quite clearly, if women's knowledge was not being rendered invisible, the use of the 2 percent land under polyculture systems should be the path followed for providing food security. Instead, these highly productive systems are **being destroyed in the name of producing more food**. Just as women's ways of growing food produce more while conserving more resources, women's ways of food processing conserve more nutrition. Hand pound- ing of rice or milling rice with a foot-operated mortar and pestle preserves more protein, fat, fiber, and minerals in rice. Thus when mechanical hullers replace hand pounding by women as in the case of Bangladesh where 700 new mills supplanted the paid work of 100,000 to 140,000 women in one year by reducing the labor input from 270 hours per ton to 5. They not only rob women of work and livelihoods, they also rob girls of essential nutrients. Yet this process of food value destruction is called "value addition" in **patriarchal economics**. Feeding the world requires producing more food and nutrition with fewer resources - i.e., producing more with less. In this, women are experts and their expert- ise needs to filter into our institutions of agricultural research and development. However, instead of building on women's expertise in feeding the world through diversity, the dominant system is rushing headlong into destroying diver- sity and women's food-producing capacities, the pirating the results of centuries of innovating and breeding through patenting. Lack of women's property rights are a major constraint on women's capacity to feed the world. These property rights include rights to land, and common prop- erty rights to common resources like water and biodiversity. Women have been the custodians of biodiversity. New intellectual property rights are **alienating women's rights to biodiversity and erasing their innovation embodied in agricultural bio- diversity**. If the erosion of women's capacity for feeding the world has to be prevented, I PR regimes need to evolve sui generis systems that recognize and protect women's collective and informal innovation. While women are being denied their rights to resources and we are **seeing the feminization of subsistence agriculture**, the **dominant agriculture is showing increasing signs of masculinization** as it appropriates resources and rights from women in subsistence agriculture and presents itself as the only alternative for feed- ing the world.

### Food Security Link (Short)

**Agriculture no longer under women’s hands leads to food transforming into a commodity**

**Shiva 09**

[Vandana Shiva, Indian scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist and anti-globalisation author, “Women and the Gendered Politics of Food” in Philosophical Topics Volume 37, Issue 2, Fall 2009 Global Gender Justice, pg. 17-32]//dawn

From seed to table, **the food chain is gendered**. When seeds and food are in women's hands, seeds reproduce and multiply freely, food is shared freely and respected. However, women's seed and food economy has been discounted as "productive work." Women's seed and food knowled has been discounted as knowledge. Globalization has led to the transfer of seed and food from women's hands to corporate hands. Seed is now patented and genetically engineered. It is treated a the creation and "property" of corporations like Monsanto. Renewable se becomes nonrenewable. Sharing and saving seed becomes a crime. Diversity, nourished by centuries of women's breeding, disappears, and with it the culture and natural evolution that is embodied in the diversity is lost forever. Food, too, is transformed in corporate hands. It is no longer our nourishment, it becomes a commodity. And as a commodity it can be manipulated and monopolized. If food grain makes more money as cattle feed than it does as food for human consumption, it becomes cattle feed. If food grain converted to biofuel run automobiles is more profitable, it becomes ethanol and biodiesel.

**Industrialization of agriculture under capitalist patriarchy links directly to the disappearance of biodiversity**

**Shiva 09**

[Vandana Shiva, Indian scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist and anti-globalisation author, “Women and the Gendered Politics of Food” in Philosophical Topics Volume 37, Issue 2, Fall 2009 Global Gender Justice, pg. 17-32]//dawn

Food riots do bring the politics of hunger to the front page of the media. But there is a hidden hunger that denies nearly a billion people of their right to food. And there is a problem of malnutrition related to obesity and other food-related dis- eases. Hunger and obesity (or the fears of it) are feminist issues both because their worst victims are women and girls, and also because they are result of a food sys- tem shaped and controlled by capitalist patriarchy. Malnutrition is both a result of denial of access of food as well as disappear- ance of nutrition from our farms and processing systems. **Disappearance of biodiversity** on farms is l**inked to disappearance of women from farms**. This is food insecurity for the girl child. Malnutrition in childhood leads to malnutrition in adulthood. Anemia is the most significant deficiency women suffer from. Anemia is also the most significant reason for maternal mor- tality. When underfed girls become mothers, they give birth to low-birth-weight babies, vulnerable to disease and deprived of their right to full, healthy, wholesome personhood. Usually these issues of health are not connected to growing of food and farm- ing. But nutrition begins on the farm, and malnutrition begins on the farm. We are what we eat. But what are we eating? What are we growing on our farms? How are we growing it? What impact does it have on our health and on the planet? Food safety, food security, and agriculture are intimately interrelated. How we grow our food and what we grow determines what we eat and who eats. It determines the quality and safety of our food. Yet food safety, food security, and agriculture have been separated from one another. Food is being produced in ways that is robbing the majority of people of food, and those who are eating are eating bad food. Third- World countries are carrying a double burden of food-related disease, hunger, and obesity. The WHO/FAO have predicted that by the year 2020 it is pro- jected that 70 percent of ischaemic heart disease deaths, 75 percent of stroke deaths, and 70 percent of diabetes deaths will occur in developing countries. These dis- eases, called noncommunicable diseases, are directly linked to diet. The world is producing enough food for all. However, billions are being denied their right to food. The globalized industrialized food system is creating hunger in many ways. Firstly, industrialized agriculture is based on destruction of small farmers. Uprooted and dispossessed peasants join the ranks of the hungry. Secondly, industrialized agriculture is capital intensive. It is based on costly external inputs such as purchased and nonrenewable seeds, synthetic fertilizers, pes- ticides, herbicides. Peasants get into debt to buy these inputs. To pay back debt they must sell all they grow, thus depriving themselves of food. If they cannot pay their debts they loose their land. And they are increasingly loosing their lives. More than 150,000 farmers in India have committed suicide as costs of inputs have increased, and the price of their produce has fallen, thus trapping them into debt. Malnutrition and hunger is also growing because farmers are being pushed into growing cash crops for exports. The nature of agriculture and the nature of food is being transformed. Agri- culture, the care of the land, the culture of growing good food is being transformed into corporate, industrial activity. **Food is being transformed** from being a source of nutrition and sustenance **into being a commodity**. And as a commodity, it will first flow to factory farms and now cars. The poor will get the leftover. Factory farms are a negative food system. They consume more food than they produce. Industrial beef requires 10 kg of feed to produce 1 kg of food. Industrial pork requires 4.0-5.5 kg of feed to produce 1 kg of food. Factory- farmed chicken requires 2.0-3.0 times more feed than it produces as food.10 Industrial biofuels are putting a new pressure on food. Food prices in Mexico have doubled since corn, the staple for Mexican tortillas, is being increasingly used to make ethanol for fuel. Corn, soya, and canola are all being diverted to feed cars while people starve.

### Language Link

#### **US officials uses terms associated with gender sterotypes to describe other nations – lays foundation for hegemonic masculinity mindset of the U.S.**

Costigliola ’97 – Frank, a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance”, Spring 1997, Oxford University Press, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/24913279.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:1d4dbe043a72071f54e4a04e33d89925&ab_segments=0/SYC-6451/test&origin=&acceptTC=1>

Throughout the Cold War, metaphors of gender and of pathology re mained available to those officials or analysts who sought to emphasize the "Soviet threat." Just as Kennan at the onset of the Cold War employed emotive language to signify the Soviets as a hypermasculine, monstrous force, two decades later other officials used similar representations to delegiti mate what they feared as uncontrolled détente along the German-German border. As Foreign Minister Willy Brandt reached out to the German Demo cratic Republic, a U.S. State Department analysis in October 1968 characterized his nascent Ostpolitik as "the near-pathetic speeches and statem leaders overflowing with 'good will' and asking friend and foe and at least 'understanding.' " The State Department docum from this behavior that West Germans "are not only jittery and that they feel helpless." The language here - "near-pathetic," " ened," and "helpless" - coded the West Germans as emasculated suggested that West Germans had lost their self-discipline and uphold necessary boundaries. The position of the word "overfl "leaders" suggested that not only the statements and speeches o but also those officials themselves were spilling over with fem or sympatny, good win, ana understanding - not tne stun or reaipoiitiK. Furthermore, the document argued, the West as a whole had demonstrated "marked passivity," in the face of the August 1968 Czech invasion and appeared "rather soft" on the issue of access to Berlin. In language that recalled Kennan's long telegram, the State Department document contrasted the insufficient masculinity of the West with the invasive hypermasculinity of the East. "Coldly systematic and inexorable," the East Germans were becoming "harder and harsher" and appeared ready to "dem onstrate to Bonn its utter impotence and helplessness." East Germany would accomplish this final rape and emasculation "by sudden rapid thrusts" of "specialized forces" into West Berlin.'4 This characterization of détente as making the West vulnerable to emasculation did not mean that the U.S. government opposed détente as such. Rather, détente was a contested policy; this document represented thinking that remained locked in the Cold War paradigm; and even proponents of détente such as Elenry Kissinger wanted the United States to control the process and to prevent a race to Moscow. Although this essay focuses on the emotive language used by U.S. officials to naturalize their superiority and to depoliticize the Western allies' contrary points of view, such language was not, of course, an American monopoly. Rather, tropes of gender, pathology, and other figures of speech — which draw their emotional power from deeply felt notions about the body, the psyche, and the supposed immutable order of the most private aspects of life - are available to any people who believe themselves superior to, and able to judge, others. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that British Treasury and Foreign Office officials used such discourse, notably in 1945—46, when they still hoped to regain their prewar prominence and to guide their presumptively less sophisticated transatlantic cousins. British analysts clung to a structure of meaning based on the perceived opposition between their masculine rationality — "ripe and calm wisdom," as John Maynard Keynes put it — and the Americans' less-than-mas culine emotionalism. The British ambassador in Washington depicted Ameri can leaders as suffering from "uneasy bewilderment," "fear of the unknown," "baffled dismay," and "a constant disposition to prefer the emotional to the rational approach." Furthermore, the Americans were "nervous," "lackjed] stable purpose," and put their "faith in the magic of large words." To counter U.S. bragging about the atomic bomb - that "hubbub of emotional talk" - the United Kingdom would marshal its own masculine-coded superweapon, namedly "lucid ... appeals to reason and the logic of hard fact

### Military Link

#### The military is the most fundamental representation of masculinity and justifies war in order to protect the women

**Christensen 22** [Ann-Dorte, Professor of Sociology and Social work, Aalborg University, “From military to militarizing masculinites” NORMA]

In many societies, the military institution is discursively constructed as a key ‘masculinity maker’; compulsory military service is considered a disciplinary rite de passage that turns boys into men. Hence, the relationship between masculinities, warfare and the military as a social institution is an important field of inquiry for feminist research and critical masculinity studies (Connell, 1995). As such, it has provoked theoretical discussions about the reproduction of patriarchal gender relations and hegemonic masculinity as well as rich empirical work on the construction of military masculinities and the performances and experiences of being a soldier (Barrett, 1996; Do & Samuels, 2021). At the same time, critical scholarship within feminism, gender studies and military studies has widened the analysis of militarism and war to encompass cultural and institutional processes of militarization beyond the military as an institution, for instance in relation to violent masculinities, popular culture, social protest and changes (Woodward & Duncanson, 2017; see also NORMA Volume 10, Number 3–4, 2015)1 The American feminist theorist Cynthia Enloe (2000) has argued that the male soldier, represented as the hero and the warrior, is one of the most fundamental representations of masculinity, and R.W. Connell (1995) has argued that the military is the most important arena for defining hegemonic masculinity in a European and American context. This basic assumption about gender connotations, presenting men as aggressive and violent protectors and women as peaceful and non-violent caregivers, has characterized feminist studies and critical military studies during the last decades (Duncanson, 2015, 2020; Higate, 2003; Morgan, 1994; Sørensen 2015; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Woodward & Jenkings, 2011). Many feminist scholars have also used the concept of hegemonic masculinities to grasp the dynamic and the contradictions within militarized masculinities. Claire Duncanson, for instance, has argued that the concept has been an important analytical tool for critical scholars in highlighting the multiple, dynamic and contradictory character of masculinities in the military. It has underlined that the ideal of ‘combat-experienced commanding officer is not the only form of masculinity, but it is a very powerful model, which through consent, has dominated as one form of “ideal man”’ (Duncanson, 2020, p. 471). Some scholars have argued that while military studies and feminist research have given much attention to the construction of militarized masculinities within the military system, less scholarly attention has been paid to veteran masculinities in transitions from military to civilian life after deployment. This raises important questions about if, how, or to what extend militarized masculinities can be unmade and deconstructed, and how these processes interfere in family lives and social relations? (Bulmer & Eichler, 2017; Moelker, Andres, Bowen, & Manigart, 2015). War and military are closely connected to nationalist discourses. These are based on the classical distinction between citizen-the-mother and citizen-the soldier and the conceptualizations of men as aggressive and violent, fighting for the sake of women and children, and women as peaceful anti-violent mothers (Encloe, 1980; Pateman, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Even though these traditional constructions have been challenged in recent decades, they are still alive and often emerge in new forms, for instance in arguments for Western military international intervention (Messerschmidt James, 2010) as well as in presentations of women going into the army or returning from military service (Alexiyevich, 1988). In many historical and contemporary contexts, militarized masculinities are also closely related to political power and dominance. This has for instance been the case in the United States, where military position and experience have been important for political influence; for instance, the position as a war hero or the opposite – a ‘wimp’ – characterized the public image of the presidents George H.W. Bush and his son, George W. Buch (Ducat, 2004; Messerschmidt James, 2010). Important theoretical contributions have been made by critical scholars who study militarization of social and cultural institutions beyond the military (Enloe, 2000; Giroux, 2008). One of the most influential scholars, Catherine Lutz, argues that: Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious – the increasing size of armies and the resurgence of militant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms – but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action. (Lutz, 2007, p. 320) Scholars studying militarization have further explored how popular cultural representations of soldier and war romanticize and normalize violence, especially through Hollywood films (Behnke, 2006; Boggs & Pollard, 2017; Davies & Philpott, 2012; Stahl, 2010) but also through other media. Book markets have in recent decades become infused with war memories written by former soldiers (see Woodward & Jenkings, 2018). Of countless examples, two are Mark Owen – who claims to have been the one killing Osama Bin Laden – and Chris Kyle, who’s bestselling autobiography American Sniper also became a huge blockbuster movie. Persons with experience as Navy Seals have also had commercial successes in the self-help and leadership industry in recent years. An example is Jocko Willink, a highly decorated former Navy Seal commander of Seal team 3’ s Task Unit Bruiser (which included Chris Kyle) in Ramadi, Irak. Upon retiring in 2010, Willink has become somewhat of a media celebrity on YouTube, Ted-Talks, podcasts, as well as a business consultant and bestselling author of several leadership and children’s books. In these books and media appearances, Willink thus converted his embodied ‘war capital’ and military masculinity into a prospering business and in the process contributes to reproducing the symbolic relationship between military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity.

### Outer Space Link

#### Space exploration represents the fantasy of western colonialism. White valiant masculine representation of space programs excludes women and minorities

Lanius 08 (Roger D., Senior Curator Division of Space History National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution, “Heroes in a Vacuum: The Apollo Astronaut as Cultural Icon.” The Florida Historical Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 2, Fall 2008, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20700214>, pd)

In both fact and fiction, the space suit has been a core representation of the astronaut, essentially a knight's armor worn heroically as the individual conducts his noble mission. More than any other single artifact of the Moon landing program the Apollo space suit represented the values that supported Americans going into space in the first place. It symbolized and reified the Utopian desire to colonize the Solar System and make a perfect society at a new and pristine place beyond the corrupt Earth. It also stood, as cultural historian Debra Benita Shaw wrote, "as a metaphor for the transcendent power of scientific ingenuity and technological know-how....It is thus a significant icon in contemporary cultural representations of the body in both outer and terrestrial space."56 As an enduring icon of Apollo, the space suited astronauts on the Moon conjured images of power and masculinity far beyond that actually present. The anonymity of those astronauts, with their visors down similar to Medieval knights made them even more mysterious and attractive. Without intending it, the space suit became synonymous with a set of values referring "to heroism and thus to the Cartesian (masculine) subject identified by the Proper Name but the Name itself becomes curiously disconnected from the individual to which it actually refers."57 At some level, there fore, the Apollo astronaut in his space suit projected the image of the hardbody of masculinity that Susan Jeffords believes became so prevalent in the 1980s, anticipating that later development by twenty years.58 By being consumed by a space suit, as Donna Haraway has pointed out, the astronaut essentially became a cyborg as an iconic space suit established the relationship between human and machine. Cyborg ontology is a critical element of thinking about the duality of this relationship, confounding the sense in which bodies move in apposition to the technology.59 Megan Stern's analysis of visored astronauts in spacesuits suggest that they are essentially anonymous, a screen on which anyone might project any attribute from fantasies of heroism to submission. Therefore, the Apollo astronauts in their suits became screens for the whole of America to project its hopes, wishes, fears, and horrors. Each astro naut felt this keenly, as they have lived out the remainder of their lives in the glare of American fame and the sense of expectations never fully satisfied. Unable always to reflect the qualities of strength, authority, and rationality so often projected on them, the astronauts have displayed a fragility since Apollo that is both perplexing and troubling for many who see them in later years.60 Marina Benjamin described this best when she encountered three Apollo astronauts at a celebrity and collectors show. She wrote that they were "just like movie stars; they burned brightly in the glare of publicity when they were offered good parts to play and then, when the roles dried up, so did they." Their space suits, how ever, represented the triumph of technology over living organ isms.61 Those suits dominate the essence of what it means to be an astronaut; they have since Apollo and continue to do so today. The Apollo astronauts all had an image of hard-working, fun loving, virile representations of masculinity. The expression of public comfort with the white male establishment is palpable throughout the recounting of the story of Apollo. The quintessential company man worked for NASA during Apollo. The engineering "geeks" of Mission Control, with their short-sleeved white shirts, narrow black ties, slide rules hung on their belts like sidearms, and their pocket protectors complete with compass and ruler and myriad pens and mechanical pencils all personified a conservative America that many looked back on with fondness and nostalgia. Even Norman Mailer, as much an embodiment of the Sixties counter-culture as anyone, ranted about this aspect of Apollo while covering the Moon landings in 1969. Mailer expressed fascination and not a little perplexity with the time warp that he witnessed at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. He railed against an overwhelmingly white male NASA steeped in middle class values and reverence for the American flag and main stream culture. Mailer grudgingly admitted, however, that NASA's approach to task accomplishment—which he viewed as the embodiment of the Protestant Work Ethic—and its technological. and scientific capability got results with Apollo. Even so, he hated NASA's closed and austere society, one where he believed out siders were distrusted and held at arm's length with a bland and faceless courtesy that betrayed nothing. For all of his skepticism, for all of his esotericism, Mailer captures much of interest concerning rocket technology and the people who produced it in Project Apollo.62 lo.62 Mailer's critique foreshadows by twenty-five years a powerful nostalgia that has grown up around Apollo as a program that was done right, in no small part because it took place within the cultur al confines of an era before the social revolution of the 1960s. Nothing captures this nostalgia more effectively than the feature film, Apollo 13. Set in 1970 when an explosion crippled a lunar landing mission and NASA nearly lost astronauts Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and Jack Swigert, it has been recast as one of NASA's finest hours, a successful failure. At 56 hours into the flight an oxygen tank in the Apollo service module ruptured and damaged several of the power, electrical, and life support systems. People through out the world watched and waited and hoped as NASA personnel on the ground and the crew worked to find a way safely home. It was a close-run thing, but the crew returned safely on April 17, 1970. The near disaster served several important purposes for the civil space program—especially prompting reconsideration of the propriety of the whole effort while also solidifying in the popular mind NASA's collective genius.63 While one must give the NASA flight team high marks for perseverance, dedication, and an unshakable belief that they could bring the crew home safely, it is quite strange that no one seems to realize that the mission had already failed, and failed catastrophically, by the time of accident.64 The fact that Apollo 13 is now viewed as one of NASA's shining moments says much about the ability of humanity to recast historical events into meaningful morality plays. In this instance, Apollo 13 became a vehicle for criticism of the social order that emerged from the 1960s and a celebration of an earlier age. When the film appeared in 1995, reviewer John Powers, writing for the Washington Post, commented on its incessant nostalgia for "the paradisiacal America invoked by Ronald Reagan and Pat Buchananan America where men were men, women were subservient, and people of color kept out of the way." In addition, Powers wrote, "Its story line could be a Republican parable about 1995 America: A marvelous vessel loses its power and speeds toward extinction, until it's saved by a team of heroic white men." If anything, Powers underemphasized the white America evoked in Apollo 13. There were no people of color in the film and the only women with speaking parts of substance was Marilyn Lovell (Kathleen Quinlin), wife of the Apollo 13 command er, whose role is distinctly one of offering proud support while pri vately fearing the worst, and their daughter whose role seems to be as spokesperson for the social revolution then underway while con sistently reflecting its least important elements. For example, she complains in a shriekish voice that the Beatles had just broken up and that her world has accordingly collapsed. The heroes of Apollo 13 are the geeks of Mission Control, with the astronauts aboard the spacecraft as spirited but metaphorically emasculated characters to be saved. Lovell, Haise, and Swigert must wait to be rescued in a manner not unlike Rapunzel, as an active participant but unable to accomplish the task alone. As historian Tom D. Crouch wrote of this film's depiction of the "studs" in Mission Control: The real heroes of this film are either bald or sporting brush cuts; wear thick glasses; are partial to rumpled short sleeve shirts; and chain-smoke an endless string of cigarettes, cigars, and pipes. For all of that, these slide rule wielding technonerds solve all of the difficult problems required to bring the crew home. They are, in the words of one of the astronauts portrayed in the film, "steely-eyed missile men."65 Apollo 13 the film, accordingly, opens the possibility of the astro naut hero as helpless surrogate of a collection of really smart nerds on a mission. The Mission Control team, in an interesting transference of masculine power from the astronauts, assume in the best sense of American reverence for the underdog canonical status. It also venerates a long past era in American history. Indeed, it may have been an era already gone by the time of the actual mission in 1970. It is a hallowing of masculinity in a nostalgic context. A recent study completed for NASA concluded that representation of space exploration on film is highly nostalgic, and Apollo fuels that perception: As a group, the public entertainments we tend to buy into are either nostalgic visions of the "space race" period ("The Right Stuff," "Apollo 13," "From the Earth to the Moon") or fantasies reflecting the romantic imagination of the Flash Gordon/Buck Rogers era ("Star Wars" rather than "Star Trek"). These are the visions people support in the most meaningful way possible: with their time and dol lars....Boomers have a great nostalgic affection for NASA, but their own priorities have shifted from a future focus to maintaining what they have. They see money spent on space exploration as threatening their future entitle ments.66 At a sublime level, the Apollo astronauts may serve as a trope for a larger lack of interest in the future expressed by Americans at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As a country, a shifting cultural center of gravity toward maintenance of the status quo rather than looking to the future may have stalled. A shared national vision that energized earlier efforts

### Syntethic Biotech Link

**Synthetic biotech is projected as a masculine profession oppressing women and making them a minority**

**Schyfter 20** [Pablo, Doctor of Philosphy, Technology and Innovation Studies, University of Edinburgh, “Gender in synthetic biology: problems and potential,” https://www.embopress.org/doi/full/10.15252/embr.201949049]

Gender discrimination has been a problem in Western science and engineering since their start as masculine professions 234. Despite admirable progress, the association between STEM and masculinity persists 5. Women remain a minority in most STEM professions and face challenges not experienced by their male colleagues. Synthetic biology is not immune to these problems. One reason is the central role played by engineering as a template for synthetic biology. As a result, synthetic biologists model their field on those STEM professions that have been the least welcoming to women and are most strongly associated with men and masculinity. In 2015, the American Association of University Women 6 reported that women make up only 19% of US engineering bachelor's graduates and 23% of its doctorates. In the workforce, women make up proportions of only 6% (petroleum engineering) to 21% (environmental engineering). The US Department of Commerce 7, the European Commission 8 and the UK House of Commons 9 have released similar statistics. Widespread beliefs that engineering is masculine work contribute to such low representation. Building a new research field is about making choices. All choices have consequences, including unseen and unexpected ones. An engineering template might encourage synthetic biologists to shun projects or ideas that do not look enough like established engineering. Similarly, archetypes that portray engineering as a masculine profession might make women in synthetic biology appear incongruous or incapable.

### Terrorism Link

#### The affs articulation of anti-terrorism through NATO portrays women as victims needing masculine men to save them

**Hurley 14** (Hurley, M E (2014) Gendering NATO: Analyzing the Construction and Implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty-Organization’s Gender Perspective PhD, Oxford Brookes University)

These **feminist critiques of the War on Terror** therefore exposed the construction and the use¶ of ‘other’ (i.e. non-western) women within the narratives of this reinvigorated atmosphere of¶ **war and militarism**. As Krista Hunt (2002) notes the gendered natures of narratives such as:¶ “look at what they do to their women”, have ‘political currency’ (2002: 116); furthering a¶ 43¶ contrast between the ‘civilised west’ and the ‘uncivilised Afghan society’ in need of saving¶ (Ibid). Hunt identified ‘two-distinct but complementary images of Afghan women’ portrayed¶ in the media and political discourse: Afghan women were portrayed as passive victims of the¶ Taliban and on the other as vocal opponents of that regime (2002: 117), thus serving to¶ legitimise and ‘moralise’ the forceful overthrow of the regime and the subsequent¶ occupation (Ibid). The war on terror was then framed in large part by a notion of what¶ Miriam Cooke termed ‘saving brown women’ (2002: 468)21. Upon taking command of the¶ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan**, NATO** took up this mantle.¶ Indeed, Von der Lippe & Väyrynen (2011) suggest that the “saving brown women from¶ brown men” narrative combined with UNSCR 1325 to ‘facilitate a metamorphosis of the¶ **militaristic and masculine-led NATO** into a collective peacekeeper’ (2011:26) and champion¶ of women’s rights - See Figure 1. This notion of NATO as a paternal peacekeeper will be¶ returned to in Chapter 3, **in** a discussion of Iris Young’s (2003) notion of the ‘logic of¶ masculinist protection’.¶ Figure 1: “NATO: Keep the Progress Going!” – An Amnesty International Poster22¶ The ‘gendering’ of the war on terror was not simply limited to an ‘othering’ of Afghan¶ women and men and the ‘terrorist enemy’. Hunt (2002) notes that:¶ “the media coverage and political discourse following the attacks on the USA¶ exemplify the way that images of women…are being used to define the conflict; for¶ the most part women have been depicted as silent victims of the attacks…women¶ are cast as passive” (2002: 117).¶ In this sense the feminist literature dealing specifically with 9/11 and its aftermath detailed¶ the gendered processes, and the reassertion of specific gendered orthodoxies (**women as¶ passive victims in need of saving**) necessary in the production of war narratives. In this¶ respect their work draws interesting parallels with that of Susan Jeffords (1989) account of¶ the ‘re-masculinisation’ of American culture following the Vietnam war (Section 3, below).¶ In one respect the aims and findings of this thesis sit within this ‘historical-social-political’¶ context. It can be argued that the effects of 9/11 are still being felt within the international¶ political system and especially in the western security infrastructure – at the time of writing¶ this thesis, NATO, is managing a ‘transition’ from Afghanistan.¶ Detailed, experience-focused feminist analyses of the war on terror and its associated¶ conflicts (see also Enloe, 2010) built upon early feminist IR scholarship and helped to reinterrogate the gendered processes and sites of war and militarism in the first decade of the¶ twenty-first century. As Ayotte & Husain argue: “In the wake of the ‘war on terrorism’¶ feminist analysis of international relations must broaden the concept of security to consider¶ forms of violence beyond the statist security framework of realpolitik” (Ayotte & Husain,¶ 2005: 112); whilst I feel that Ayotte & Husain’s assertion somewhat neglects the important¶ contributions of early feminist writing, that began to do exactly that (Tickner, 1992; Enloe¶ 1989; Squires 1998) it represents a continuation of that work as well as a shift in certain¶ areas of feminist research towards centralising the study of war and security within a FSS¶ agenda, and Christine Sylvester’s ‘new feminist war studies’ (2013: 49 – emphasis added).¶ The research outlined above has detailed how Feminist International Relations research has¶ developed. In troubling the existing boundaries of IR and Security Studies as an academic¶ discipline the place and purpose of a distinctly Feminist IR is problematised. Should¶ Feminist IR remain embedded within the disciplinary boundaries, concepts and language of¶ IR, seeking to carve out a distinctly feminist space? Some have argued that in doing so,¶ Feminist IR would become defined by and produce work that was simply intelligible to,¶ rather than challenging to IR’s mainstream (Lobasz & Sjoberg, 2011:574; Youngs, 2004;¶ Squires & Welds, 2007; Zalewski, 2007). This debate is ongoing, yet what the research¶ outlined above (and below) demonstrate is the value of feminist research both within and¶ without IR in exposing the gendered nature of the international; in exposing the¶ incompleteness of accounts that fail to address gender and experience, and that in the words¶ of Cynthia Enloe (1989) it is gender that makes the world go round.

## Alternative

#### Alt solves – Feminism is the only solution to the continuum of violence. Overthrow of the patriarchy is key to preventing nuclear war.

Eschle 13 (Catherine, University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Subject of (Anti)Nuclear Politics: Revisiting Women's Campaigning against the Bomb”, 2013, International Studies Quarterly Vol. 57, No. 4 (December 2013), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24014644>, pd)

However, women's antinuclear activism, and indeed nuclear politics more generally,4 has faded from the pur¬view of gender and security studies in recent years. This is problematic, in the first place because it means femi¬nist IR scholars have paid negligible attention to post-Cold War nuclear developments. While it could be argued this simply reflects the demobilization of women's antinuclear campaigning in the United States and UK with the end of the Cold War and the corresponding decline of the threat posed by the nuclear arms race, feminist IR scholarship has long contested such a straightforward empiricist reading of what counts as wors¬thy of research. In any case, nuclear weapons did not dis¬appear in the 1990s and nor did campaigning against them, as we are reminded by an important but neglected body of feminist work on/aligned with critical responses to the 1997 Indian nuclear tests (e.g., Oza 2006; Das 2007; Chowdhry No date).5 The failure more generally in gender and security studies to engage with such develop¬ments serves not only to fix women's antinuclear cam- paigning in a particular form and to a particular moment, but also to aid the naturalization of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. An additional problem resulting from the decline of ongoing critical engagement with nuclear politics in gender and security studies is that the 1980s Cold War activism of such key initial influence now tends to be perceived in rather simplistic and even stereotyped ways. On the one hand, the rare mentions of nuclear politics in recent over¬views of gender and security studies imply a rather idealized view, relying as they do on a truncated version of the narra¬tive by Enloe and Sylvester et al. about Greenham women stepping into agency in IR, without critically re-examining the original texts or revisiting the evidence (Blanchard 2003:1294, 1302; Sjoberg 2009:197, note 84; Shepherd 2010a,b:78-9).6 The cumulative result is the romanticiza¬tion of the figure of the Cold War woman antinuclear cam¬paigner as a kind of feminist warrior who has now passed into the history books. On the other hand, in gender and security studies more generally, these same campaigners have been effectively demonized. With feminist IR scholars forced to confront misreadings of their own project as bio¬logically determinist by the mainstream of IR (see Tickner 1999; Shepherd 2010a), and with the rising popularity in the field of antiessentialist poststructuralist approaches, initial anxieties about women's peace politics have been strongly reinforced and attention has swung sharply in the opposite direction, toward investigations of the role of women as gender-destabilizing agents of political violence. There is an implicit assumption here that the Cold War anti¬nuclear activist is intrinsically pacific and gender-conserva-tive, the nemesis of feminist IR rather than its lost hope. As Tina Managhan has indicated (2007), however, such an assumption can and should be scrutinized. In line with Managhan, my starting point in this article is the proposition that an antiessentialist, poststructural¬ist-influenced methodology, far from necessitating the avoidance of women's antinuclear activism, can illumi¬nate it in fresh and interesting ways. Recent systematiza¬tions of this methodology in gender and security studies are set out in part one, along with the parameters of my empirical research. I then go on in part two to identify the "basic discourses" in circulation among women cam¬paigners against nuclear weapons in the United States and UK in the later Cold War period, each offering differently gendered constructions of the political subject mobilized in antinuclear struggle. In the third and final part of the article, I explore the ways in which these discourses are reproduced and reconfigured in the post-Cold War texts of Helen. Caldicott, in the United States, and Angie Zelter, in the UK. In so doing, I argue that there were multiple figures of the antinuclear campaigner circulating in Cold War women's activism and that new subjectivities are emerging in contemporary writing in ways that reflect and reproduce the shift from a Cold War to a post-Cold War context and the differing political environments of the United States and UK. I conclude that gender and security scholars ought therefore to revi¬sit fixed, unitary assumptions about the identities of women antinuclear campaigners, as one element in a broader, critical reengagement with the gendered dimen¬sions of nuclear politics. I close by suggesting some future lines of enquiry for such an undertaking, with The literature in IR combining poststructuralism and feminism is heterogeneous and rapidly expanding, but it is specifically the recent methodological recommenda¬tions with regard to gender and security studies devel¬oped separately by Lene Hansen and Laura J. Shepherd that I am interested in here. For these scholars, the sub-stantive focus of poststructuralist-influenced feminist enquiry should be on the discursive construction of gen¬dered subjects in global politics. Thus, Hansen states, " [t]he relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the center of poststructuralism's research agenda" (2006:1), while for Shepherd it is her specifically feminist "curiosity about 'the concept, nature and practice of gender"' and the ways in which "gender configures boundaries of subjectivity" in IR that drives her research (Shepherd 2008a:3, citing Zalewski). To conceive of gen¬dered selfhood as discursively constructed is to see it as "existing only insofar as it is continually rearticulated and uncontested by competing discourses" (Hansen 2006:6). Defined as systems of meaning and representa¬tion, discourses are claimed to "fix" self-understandings and interpretations of the world, and thus to reproduce power relations (Shepherd 2008a:20-3), albeit always tem¬porarily and in incomplete ways. We are thus enjoined to enquire into "multiple and competing discourses about gender ... and security ... [which] articulate specific sub¬jects, ascribe identities to these subjects and position them in relation to each other" (Shepherd 2010b:76), thereby instantiating gendered relations of domination and resistance. As both Shepherd and Hansen make clear, the "discur¬sive ontology" (Hansen 2006:17) underpinning their approach is radically antiessentialist. In general terms, it entails rejection of the analytical utility of distinguishing between nondiscursive and discursive realms, and with this the possibility of enquiring into the material roots of tex¬tual representations, in favor of illuminating how material realities become interpreted as such (Hansen 2006:21-3; Shepherd 2008a:17-19). More specifically, this is an ontol¬ogy that goes beyond the argument in earlier second-wave feminism that the biological fixities of sex are distinct from and nondetermining of gendered identities and roles that are rather socially constructed and challengeable. A post¬structuralist-influenced feminist perspective necessitates rather a more thorough-going discursive constructionism in which the continual reenactment of the gender norms circulating in discourse is seen to shape and give meaning to concrete bodily differences. On this view, the chief task of the scholar bridging feminist and poststructuralist tradi¬tions should be to destabilize apparent certainties about both sex and gender rather than to make claims about or on behalf of gendered identities and thus reinforce power relations. In this light, my claim that Hansen and Shep¬herd's framework can help to illuminate antinuclear cam¬paigning by women needs some justification. There are two issues here that need disentangling. The first has to do with biological essentialism, and whether women's antinuclear activism and the study of it necessarily replicates the view that there are characteristic male and female traits, which are presocial or natural, and which determine immutable social and political outcomes. On this point, it should be recalled that the pioneering feminist IR writings mentioned above not only elaborated a critique of crass assumptions about the embodied subjectivities of women and men circulating in antinuclear discourses, but also lauded certain enactments of antinuclear campaigning as destabilizing of gender certainties, most notably at Green-ham Common. Moreover, as Managhan's more recent study of campaigners at Greenham and elsewhere demonstrates (2007), even when biologically essentialist identities are mobilized, they may have subversive political results.? Managhan concludes that the tactical effects of such identi¬ties should be subjected to careful empirical investigation from a poststructuralist-feminist perspective, rather than assumed a priori to be problematic (2007:646). By implica¬tion, their discursive construction merits critical scrutiny, rather than dismissal or avoidance. A second and more serious issue arises, however, if we accept the premise that a focus on women's antinuclear campaigning necessarily rests on an essentialist approach to the gendered subject in more general terms—assuming fixed, stable entities called women who exist prior to, and who are productive of, discourses and texts. Yet this pre¬mise too is contestable. Many poststructuralist feminists have argued on political grounds that it is possible to maintain a deconstructive analytical approach toward gen¬der while simultaneously pursuing an empirical focus on women, in an effort to avoid "complicity with mainstream efforts to 'write women out of IR" ' (Managhan 2007:644, citing Sylvester). In this vein, such scholars have combined "elements of skepticism, particularly about the social formation of subjects, with elements of a standpoint femi¬nism that has us acknowledging and interpreting what subjects say" (Sylvester 1994:52). Others have sought to develop a more theoretically consistent justification for their focus on women as subjects. Alison Stone, for one, has reinterpreted Butler as implying that "women" have "a history, a genealogy, a 'line of descent"' (2005:5, citing Gatens; see also 2004:15-23), with gender identities, how-ever, fleeting and unstable crystallizing in a layering pro¬cess through which past constructions leave their traces on what follows: "All women thus become located within an ongoing chain of practice and reinterpretation, which brings them into complex filiations with one another" (Stone 2004:19). As Shepherd concludes (2008a:4), such a view "allows for research that investigates the ways in which 'women' as subjects and objects act, speak, write and represent themselves, are represented, written about, spoken about and acted on" 8-including, one assumes, within the context of antinuclear discourses. After all, these have long been the site for the (self-)construction of feminized subjectivities in oppositional relation to the masculinized nuclear state, albeit largely within white, Western, middle-class parameters. So how, more concretely, should such research on women antinuclear campaigners be conducted? Hansen and Shepherd imply that written texts offer a particularly fruitful starting point, as sites in which discourses about gendered subjects are circulated and in which instances or practices of gendered representation are embodied (Shepherd 2008a:24-5). While neither author focuses entirely on the written word, also examining visual imagery and the body (Hansen 2000:300-305; 2007; Shepherd 2008a:24; 2008b), their stress on systems of representation and meaning-making nonetheless goes hand-in-hand with an emphasis on "the analytical centrality of language" (Shepherd 2008a:3) as "articulated in written and spoken text" (Hansen 2006:2). In the case of antinuclear politics, such an emphasis presents a useful empirical alternative to the mass mobilizations and embodied practices that so caught the attention of Enloe et al.9 These may continue to enjoy a nostalgic recirculation in the field of gender and security studies, but are no longer characteristic of antinu¬clear campaigning in the United States and UK today. For advice on text selection, Hansen is particularly help¬ful. Key to her schema is the poststructuralist assumption about the "intertextuality" of discourse, that is, the view that "texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts," often across the boundaries of particular genres and across space and time, shifting the contours and nodes of a discourse as they do so (Hansen 2006:8, see also 55-72). She develops several models of intertextuality, the first focused on official discourse and documents, the second examining also wider foreign pol¬icy debates, and a third including either representations in popular culture, or the more "marginal political dis¬courses" of social movements and academic commentary (2006:59-64). All three models entail a preliminary focus on primary texts with the researcher then moving outward to secondary sources and conceptual histories, paying close attention to the rhetorical structures typical of the different genres examined (Hansen 2006:52-4, 65-72). The selection of texts for Hansen also depends on the temporal framing of a particular investigation (whether it examines a singular moment, historical development over time, or compares different time periods) and the num¬ber or type of "Selves" being studied, as well as on consid¬erations of textual clarity, popularity, authority, and availability (2006:73-87).10 Having thus identified a field of texts, the researcher should identify within them a handful of "basic discourses" that serve to structure politi¬cal discussion and imaginative possibilities (Hansen 2006:51-2). Then "one might subsequently (re)turn to a detailed study of the articulations of identity and policy within particular texts ... and situate them inside the con¬text of the larger political debate" (Hansen 2006:52). Shepherd focuses her methodological arguments more on techniques of textual analysis. She outlines two steps in this regard, the first focusing on the "rhetorical sche¬mata" of a text and involving a search for the linguistic structures that provide a sense of order in texts, thus constructing the meaning of the concepts ... In the identifica¬tion of representational practices specific to gender, for exam¬ple, I look for instances of gendered identities described "as" or "like", statements about gendered identities that can be problematized, and emphasis on aspects of gender provided by placement within the text. (Shepherd 2008a:30)” The second step involves an analysis of "predica¬tion/subject positioning" (Shepherd 2008a:26, 30-1), which requires unpacking both claims made about the gendered attributes of a person or thing by examining the associated adjectives and other descriptive words or qualifiers, and its position in relation to claims in the text about other persons or things. This chimes with Hansen's claim that a deconstructive reading illuminates identity construction in terms of a "process of linking," whereby a positive series of signifiers are connected to a particular subject, and a "process of differentiation" whereby signs gain their meaning from explicit or implicit contrast with their opposite (2006:19-21). As Hansen reminds us, the researcher should consider not only how discursive stabil¬ity is achieved, but also "instabilities and slips" in the articulation of relationships between identities (2006:42).12 These methodological arguments underpin the dis¬course analysis of antinuclear women's campaigning in the United States and UK that I present in the rest of the article. In Hansen's terms, this is a single Self enquiry, focusing on gendered constructions of the antinuclear activist. With regard to its temporal framing, it is the recent historical development of this Self which is under review, from the 1980s to the present. And with regard to its underlying model of intertextuality, my study examines the "marginal political discourses" of social movement activists, as well as academic commentary about them. In what follows, my reading of the material from and on activist circles in the UK and United States in the 1980s, ranging from pamphlets to academic books to Web documents, seeks to outline the "basic discourses" in circulation in this period, each mobilizing rival concep¬tions of gendered subjectivity and thus of the antinuclear campaigner. Turning to the post-Cold War period, in which the discursive field is sparser with little secondary commentary, I focus on texts by two well-known cam¬paigners that I suggest serve as sites of authoritative meaning-making among activists. A detailed deconstruc¬tion of the rhetorical structure and predicates in these texts is undertaken in order to expose continuities and shifts in the gendered constructions of the earlier period. Revisiting Cold War Discourses With the revival of the Cold War in the early 1980s and the accompanying resurgence of the peace movement around the world, and in the wake of the second wave of feminism, larger numbers of women than ever before mobilized against nuclear weapons. A new generation of all-women groups and women-led actions was launched: The United States, for example, saw the emergence of WAND—Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (Cal-dicott 1997:296-9)—and "the Ribbon," which involved 20,000 women and their male supporters wrapping embroidered cloth around the Pentagon (Pershing 1996). Moreover, many women did not confine them¬selves to ostensibly feminine or civil modes of political organizing, instead advocating changes in gender rela¬tions and participating in the revived direct action wing of the movement (Gusterson 1996:193-7, 213-4; Wittner 12 Shepherd advocates these strategies within the context of a Derridean double reading (2008a:28). This seems to be particularly suitable as a way of destabilizing texts that have ossified interpretations with wide authority. It may be, however, less helpful in initial efforts to uncover and unpack marginal political discourses. 2000). It is in this context that "Women's Pentagon Action" organized dramatic demonstrations and block¬ades, for example (Women's Pentagon Action 1982; Linton and Whitham 1989), and that the women's peace camp phenomenon arose. Women made their homes at Seneca Falls and Puget Sound in the United States (Paley 1989; Russell 1989a; Krasniewicz 1992) and at various nuclear bases across Europe, with Greenham Common camp in the UK remaining the earliest, largest, and most well-known example (Cook and Kirk 1983; Roseneil 1995, 2000; Hipperson 2005). Several basic discourses about gender and nuclear weapons helped structure this wave of mobilization. Such plurality has already been noted by academic commenta¬tors beyond IR: In the course of Hugh Gusterson's eth¬nography of the Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory and protests against it (1996:212-3), Roseneil's (1995): 4-7) analysis of the camp at Greenham, and Helen Lidd¬ington's (1991:6-8) overview of the historical antecedents of British women's peace mobilization, three main narra¬tives are identified, with each author naming and describ¬ing the three in varying terms. On my reading, however, six discourses can be distinguished, each giving rise to a different construction of the antinuclear activist. These discourses can be labeled, respectively, maternalist, antivi-olence, culturalist, materialist, cosmopolitan, and cosmo¬logical in character. To begin with, the maternalist discourse brought the fig¬ure of the "Mother-in-Action" to the fore as the key pro¬tagonist in antinuclear struggle (e.g., Caldicott 1986:236). Speaking to and from the reproductive capacities of women, and insisting on the importance of the caring responsibilities and values traditionally associated with them (Ruddick 1989), this discourse implied that a nuclear-free world required the reevaluation, reimagin¬ing, and extension of maternal values and practices, and the displacement of their masculine corollaries (Caldicott 1986:241-2). It thus provided a positive justification for women-led or women-only organizing, encouraging those who had previously been marginalized because of their association with caring responsibilities to make connec¬tions across the private and public realm and become a force for broader political change. The workings of this discourse can be seen in the repeated emphasis placed on motherhood in explanations given by individuals for their mobilization (Roseneil 2000:46, 56-9; Pettit 2006:24-6); in the decorative and symbolic use of photo¬graphs of and drawings by children at protest events (Cook and Kirk 1983:31; Pershing 1996:128-9); and in the revitalization and reworking in activist circles of crafts associated with white, middle-class feminine domesticity such as embroidery (Krasniewicz 1992:60-6; Pershing 1996). One complementary discourse could be termed antivi¬olence, focused as it was on the problematic masculinity of the mainstream political subject and its connection to nuclear politics. Here, masculinity was constructed either as intrinsically pathological or as structurally corrupted: Either way, nuclear weaponry was contextualized on a continuum of violence perpetrated by men and male-dominated institutions—from rape, through domestic violence, to war (Held 1988; Russell 1989b). Within the terms of this discourse, the roots of violence were located in male sexuality and an associated drive to dom¬inate women, nonwhites, and nature (Kokopeli and La-key 1982:233, 235-8; Easlea 1983), and/or to a larger system or structure of "patriarchy" (Warnock 1982; Zanotti 1982), both explanations bearing witness to the influence of radical feminist analyses (Koen and Swaim 1980:1; Roseneil 1995:6-7; 2000:34). Although it was pri¬marily concerned to critique pronuclear male subjectiv¬ity, this discourse had the effect of elevating existing models of femininity and womanhood, providing as it did a negative justification for women-only organizing against the bomb (Held 1988; Rosenbluth and Russell 1989:302-5). A generalized figure of the "Woman" became by default the bearer of antinuclear struggle, a world without nuclear weapons requiring variously the feminization of male psychology, the overthrow of male power and patriarchal structures by women, or even limi¬tations on the numbers of men born into the world (Gearhart 1982). The culturalist discourse, in contrast, had a distinctive emphasis on the cultural construction of hegemonic male and female subjects and the need for and possibility of challenging both. This discourse again positioned patriar¬chy as the structural context in which nuclear weaponry gained its symbolic resonance, but there was also some consideration here of the ways in which patriarchy over¬lapped with and was constituted by power relations such as heterosexism and racism (Smith 1989). This enabled the articulation of a more complex, intersectional cri¬tique of the ways in which dominant forms of masculinity underpinned and fed into Cold War nuclearism (see e.g., Hartsock 1989; Spretnak 1989; Strange 1989). It also allowed for an avowedly feminist "queering" of dominant models of femininity (as embodied, for example, in maternal tropes and their association with middle-class, white, heterosexual respectability) and advocacy of alter-native ways of being (Snitow 1989; Roseneil 2000: chap¬ters 7 and 10). Overall, the discourse hinged on the construction of the "Reflexive Activist," whose critical self-examination and insistence on the stratified, change¬able character of gender, was positioned as central to the struggle for change. As Gusterson (1996:212) indicates, culturalist arguments pointed ultimately to a vision of the postnuclear world as "androgynous," with gender differ¬ence no longer playing a politically meaningful role. The fourth discourse was materialist in character, emphasizing the impact of nuclear weapons and their cost. Widespread in the antinuclear movement (Roseneil 1995:5), when circulating in and through women's activ¬ism, this discourse was frequently typified by a preoccupa¬tion with the impact of nuclear weapons on female bodies and lives. The implications for the reproductive system of exposure to radiation were highlighted, for example (Koen and Swaim 1980), or the deleterious effects on health, education, and welfare budgets of pri¬oritizing spending on weaponry (Beneria and Blank 1989; Omolade 1989). Gender figured in this discourse as dif¬ferential embodiment and lived social roles rather than as an identity or form of power. But, gender was also interpolated in a more abstract way, in terms of a repeated emphasis on the impact and cost of nuclear weapons on human bodies, relationships, and the natural world. The abstractions of nuclear rationality, as pursued by a technocratic, Western, masculine subject, were thus confronted by the concrete, embodied mode of reason¬ing historically associated with feminine (and also non¬white, non-Western) subjectivity, but here assumed to be more widely shared (Buirski 1983; Pettit 1983). In this way, the discourse constructed a feminized but potentially inclusive figure of the antinuclear activist we could call the "Empath." A very different tack was taken in the cosmopolitan dis-course, which focused on women's political exclusion from the defense and political establishments of the nuclear state. Epitomized in British author Virginia Woolf s antiwar rallying cry from an earlier age—"As a woman I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world"—this dis-course was rearticulated in the Cold War period by radi¬cal feminists who, assuming an undifferentiated commonality of experience of oppression among women worldwide, aspired to a global sisterhood rather than entry into male-dominated institutions." The sense of sisterly connection can be seen, for example, in accounts of the international character of Greenham and the soli¬darity actions that took place around the world (Cook and Kirk 1983:32, 62), as well as in critiques of the loyal¬ties and symbols of mainstream patriotism in both the UK and United States (e.g., Krasniewicz 1992:chapter 8). In addition, security was reenvisioned within the parame¬ters of this discourse in ways that made it more inclusive of women's experiences and transborder relationships. Militarism and the supposed protection it offered were subjected to critical scrutiny (Ruehl 1983; Thompson 1983; Wood 1983); the counterproductive character of violence was documented (Cook and Kirk 1983); and empathetic connections were forged with the ostensibly threatening "Other" (Porter 1983; Mooney 1983:5, 14). In such ways, this discourse reconfigured community and the methods used to protect it, rather than gender. It effectively contrasted a compromised male political sub¬ject in the form of the citizen or politician to an ethical female subject, the "Sister," who transcended geopoliti¬cal specificities. Finally, the cosmological discourse mobilized gendered imagery as part of its holistic conception of the universe and the role of humans within it. In its ecological variant, this discourse drew on a self-conscious ecofeminism (Epstein 1991:176-8; Alonso 1993:246-7) and was mani¬fested in claims about women's connectedness to the nat¬ural world (Salamone 1982; Women's Pentagon Action 1982), in critiques of a dualistic masculine worldview involving separation from and mastery over nature (Grif¬fin 1989; Strange 1989), and in the images of nature pep¬pering women's life stories, poetry, and other texts (Linton and Whitham 1989:186; Pettit 2006:24, 27). In its spiritual variant (Epstein 1991:chapter 5), the discourse gave rise to widespread Goddess iconography (McAllister 1982:ix; Jones 1989:201) and pagan/wiccan narratives and rituals (Epstein 1991:183-92; Krasniewicz 1992:53-60). The antinuclear activist was constituted here as a potent feminine figure, either "Earth Mother" or "Goddess," and urged to exert her powers to usher in an alternative future for the planet. Although it is helpful analytically to delineate these six basic discourses about gender and (anti)nuclear politics in Cold War women's activism, they and the identities they constructed should not be misunderstood as inter¬nally monolithic and sharply distinct from each other in their empirical instantiation. To begin with, the dis¬courses were internally heterogeneous and conflictual. There were rival articulations of a cosmological frame¬work, as I have shown, and also of maternalism, with women's caring capacity rooted sometimes in biologically determinist accounts of their physiology and thereby seen 13 Which is why I think Liddington is incorrect to label this discourse "equal rights." as eternal (Caldicott 1986), sometimes in their socially constructed caring roles and thereby envisioned as chang¬ing and changeable (Ruddick 1989).14 Moreover, the boundaries between discourses were permeable. Thus, cosmological visions resonated with maternalism in their reimagining of femininity while, to take another example, the antiviolence and culturalist discourses both pointed toward patriarchy as the structural context in which men and masculinity gained their power and women and femi¬ninity were subordinated and oppressed. Finally, even the most divergent discourses were not indelibly associated with antithetical political projects and political subjects, but rather offered overlapping and competing sources of meaning-making and identity construction within the same action or text. This is made very clear in detailed ethnographies of the women's peace camps (Krasniewicz 1992; Roseneil 1995, 2000). As I will show in the next part of the article, instability, porousness, and simultane¬ity continue to characterize the six discourses as they have recirculated in the post-Cold War period, along with some notable shifts in content and in the activist identi¬ties thereby produced.

#### We solve the Aff’s impacts -- the core value of feminism is pacifism and the end of war. Hegemonic masculinity is key to violence.

**Rodríguez-Galán 11** (Marta B, Associate Professor of Sociology/Anthropology & Public Health, Director Gerontology, *Hegemonic Masculinity and Counter-hegemonic Feminist Discourses for Peace*, Publish: St. John Fisher College.) JYC

The position of women condemning war as mothers has been the subject of much debate among feminists, a debate that probably traces its roots to old discussions of equality and difference feminism and interpretations of the roles of women within the family. Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain are among the pro-family feminists who have theorized about pacifist feminism (Elshtain, 1985; Ruddick, 1983). Ruddick proposed that “maternal thinking,” a way of being in the world based on the concept of “preservative love,” could present a counter ideology to a male dominated culture. Moreover, maternal thinking is not unique to women, nor to mothers, as both men and women and those without children can adopt a nurturing disposition and be socialized into maternal thinking (Ruddick, 1983). For this pacifist feminist, maternal thinking would represent the antithesis of violent masculinity. While opposed to war, Ruddick believes that there is no contradiction between being a feminist and defending the right of women to participate in the military, while at the same adopting a pacifist philosophy. In fact, the incorporation of women in the military as conscripts—not volunteers—could help to “pacify the forces,” as long as many of these women would help introduce maternal thinking. Moreover:

*We acknowledge the existence of good causes and the necessity of some battles but claim that there are entirely or principally nonviolent ways of fighting them that are at least as effective as violence (the effectiveness of which is always exaggerated) and that these nonviolent solutions cost less morally, physically, and psychologically.2*

For Jean Elshtain (1985), while most feminists agree on the gendered nature of war and militarism, the majority of them support a realist or its modified version “just war theory” posture, both of which accept war as a legitimate or justifiable political instrument. This well-known proponent of peace feminist thought has critiqued realist feminists and just war theory feminists for failing to present a challenge to the Western discourse of war and politics. According to her provocative argument, feminists must not dismiss all notions of traditional femininity, such as maternal thinking. Instead they must appropriate these images and transform them (Elshtain, 1985). Simultaneously, she also criticizes cultural feminists who assume— consciously or not—a “just war theory” position. Just war theory traces its roots to St. Augutine’s Christian political thought, which argued for the justification of war in some cases using a gendered imagery that represented women as “beautiful souls” in need of protection and men as chivalric “just warriors.” According to Elshtain, many cultural feminists who invoke the “female principle” as ontologically superior to masculinism continue the Augustian tradition of the beautiful soul. While rejecting these romanticized images of femininity, Elshtain also accuses the feminist movement of being “matrophobic” and attempts to restructure political consciousness based upon the implications of “maternal thinking” in a new kind of feminist political thought that she calls “social feminism” (Elshtain, 1985). This position is at odds with that espoused by first wave feminists –Kate Millen, Betty Friedan, Juliet Michell, Shulamith Fireston and others—who had sought to demystify the family and motherhood in order to achieve equality with men. Indeed, the role of women in the family continues to be the subject of much controversy within the feminist movement (Dietz, 1985). Mary Dietz points out some of the pitfalls of the maternal thinking argument:

*Women who do not venture beyond the family or participate in practices beyond mothering cannot attain an adequate understanding of the way politics determines their own lives. Nor can they –as mothers or creatures of the family—help transform a politics that stands in conflict with maternal values. The only consciousness that can serve as a basis for this transformation and so for the sort of active citizenry that Elshtain wishes to promote is a distinctly political consciousness steeped in a commitment to democratic values, participatory citizenship and egalitarianism3 .*

Mary Dietz and other “civic” feminist scholars advocate the peace politics of feminism but disavow its connections to motherhood and maternal thinking. In their opinion, it is feminist political consciousness rather than femaleness or mothering that makes women more pacific. Hence, both female and male feminists should be more inclined towards pacifism. Nonetheless, the fact that women are more likely to be feminists explains the gender gap on attitudes towards war (Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Dietz 1985).

#### Communication strategies of the cyberfeminist virtual community with the most popular feminist groups.

**Martyanov** Denis 20**19** “Communication Strategies of Networked Feminism in Russia” Department of Political Institutions and Applied Political Research Saint Petersburg State University St. Petersburg, Russia

Changes in Internet technologies, significant shifts in political discourse, the transformation of feminism itself will force to take a fresh look at cyberfeminism. Donna Haraway’s classic “**cyborg feminism**” was criticized and even considered an **“antifeminist” direction** [9].

The modern cyberfeminism is no longer a monolithic movement on western society. J. Danilels says that more accurate to refer to the plural, “cyberfeminism(s)” [1]. Old cyberfeminism gives way to new cyberfeminism(s) and networked feminism(s).

The large number of “cyberfeminism(s)” or “**networked feminism**(s)” means that separate groups on the Internet will use different communication strategies in order to achieve their goals.

In Russia the cybefeminist movement started in 1995, but it has not become really noticeable yet. However, the cyberfeminist community still exists and is quite active on the social network VKontakte. In connection with the of global cyberfeminism transformation, it is interesting to study the communication and discursive strategies of Russian cyberfeminism in comparison with other Russian virtual communities of networked feminists.

## Impact

#### Hegemonic masculinity leads to militarization, dehumanization, and expansion. These cause war and mass violence.

**Wojnicka 22**- (Katarzyna, Associate Professor of Sociology, Editor-in-chief for NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies, “*NORMA, Volume 17, Issue 2 (2022),* Publisher: Taylor & Francis Online)

Ukrainians awoke on the 24th of February 2022 to find themselves in a conflict over which many had been dreading but which almost as many had also thought impossible. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has also meant that we, non-Ukrainian Europeans, find ourselves in a time in which the term ‘crisis’ has taken on a much more direct presence. After over 20 years in which the so-called ‘War on Terror’ wrought death and destruction ‘elsewhere’,[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856) the actual conflict between sovereign nation-states, with the prospect of spilling over into yet another European war involving multiple nation-states is now a reality. The horrors of war are happening closer to our own countries than many of us have experienced in our lifetimes.

The gender dynamics of the invasion of Ukraine are impossible to ignore. War re-installs gendered demarcation lines that many of us, naively, thought was a relic from the past. Masculinity is mobilized as a rhetorical figure and symbolic resource in the brutal reality for all these young men and women that have to go into a war declared by older men. In the character of the fascist strongman who has become a cult figure in the global far-right, we can see someone who has been valued at home and abroad precisely for his compensatory masculinism (Löffler, Luyt, & Starck, [2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)) as well as ridiculed in Western media (Wiedlack, [2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)). Then there is the resilient, David-esque figure who has been championed for his intransigence and refusal to give up in the face of insurmountable odds. Caught in-between these political leaders are the military conscripts of all genders who are putting their lives at risk, as well as women and children who are being forced to flee as a result of imperialist aggression. On social media, people are celebrating the loss of human life and glorifying militarist responses from political leaders whilst those of us in Finland and Sweden find ourselves closer to NATO membership than at any point during our intertwined histories. It is a new formative moment that most of us wish could have been avoided.

We at NORMA have been sickened and appalled by what we have all seen in the last 2 months. Critical studies on men and masculinities could not be more relevant for analyzing the intentions and the appeal of political leaders as well as the consequences of their decisions. Two of NORMA’s recent special issues were focused on political masculinities and militarized masculinities but neither we, the editors, nor possibly the special issue editors (Christensen & Kyed, [2022](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856); Löffler et al., [2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)) could have foreseen how timely these related issues would be. Indeed, militarism and the responses to militarism *must* be understood in terms of characteristics we tend to ascribe to masculinity/masculinities. As Christensen and Kyed ([2022](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856), p. 1) highlight ‘the male soldier, represented as the hero and the warrior, is one of the most fundamental representations of masculinity’ (see also Enloe, [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)). We see this playing out today in constant coverage of the invasion as well as in the portrayal of political leaders in the years prior.

In the last decade, a handful of social scholars analyzing the nexus between Putin’s masculinity and his governance style have come to an agreement that he represents ‘an alpha male in the international arena’ (Romanets, [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)), a radical version of hypermasculinity, machismo or masculinist type of gender performance (Novitskaya, [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856), p. 160), which eventually can be described as a perfect example of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, [2005](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)). This is exemplified in the images of Putin presenting physical strength, e.g. portraying him as stripped to the waist while riding a horse and being captured on film while engaged in typical ‘male’ activities such as fishing, riding a Harley-Davidson, playing hockey, operating a firefighter’s helicopter, fighter jet or shooting, as well as doing judo (Romanets, [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)). These, combined with his hyper-heterosexuality, unlimited power over Russian society, as well as the need to subordinate all others (men, women and children) leave few doubts, that not only he can be seen as a typified personification of hegemonic masculinity but also that this particular type of gender ideology is one of the main factors that have led to the current invasion of Ukraine. According to Riabov and Riabova ([2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)), Putin’s regime is based on creating images of national masculinity and attributing masculine characteristics to the country, where militarization and heterosexualisation are the most profiled elements, and their ultimate embodiment have been Russian ‘war with terrorism’ (Riabov & Riabova [2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856), p. 45); other acts of political violence ‘(…) such as the 2008 war with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, continuing attempts to destabilise Ukraine through the military intervention in its Eastern territories, and the controversial intervention in Syria’ (Novitskaya, [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856), p. 314) and finally, the current invasion of Ukraine. As Wiedlack ([2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18902138.2022.2069856)) noted, the portrayal of Putin as a figure for homophobic ridicule in US Media affirmed Putin’s status in Russia as a bearer of hegemonic masculinity by seeking to undermine this very public presentation of hypermasculinity.

#### US geopolitics uses hegemonic masculinity to justify violence and hatred of femininity.

**Gökarıksel et al. 19** [Banu, Professor of Geography, studies of Feminist Political Geography and Geopolitics, *Demographic Fever Dreams: Fragile Masculinity and Population Politics in the Rise of the Global Right*, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society Vol. 44, Issue 3]

We turn to feminist geopolitics to understand the embodied and everyday workings of the state, borders, and political ideology, and how bodies and the most intimate aspects of life are deeply geopolitical.1 Recent research has analyzed, for instance, the ways that differently valued bodies are counted or uncounted (Hyndman 2007), violence of war spills into domestic violence (Pain 2015), the idea of the nation impinges on the bodies of ordinary people traveling through their daily lives (Fluri 2011), and the “war on drugs” comes home (Massaro 2015). This scholarship builds on well-established work on embodied nationalism that demonstrates how the nation is racialized and gendered to justify violent masculinity in its defense.2 Its focus on the political emergence of a violent masculinity as dominant complements theories of masculinity, specifically R. W. Connell’s (1987) conceptualization of hegemonic masculinity as an idealized form that regulates and shapes the range of masculinities possible within a society (see also Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Linking embodied nationalism to emergent hegemonic forms of violent masculinity deepens the analysis provided by ethnographies and oral histories that center the lived and gendered experience of such violence.3 At the same time, this research contributes to geographies of masculinities that emphasize multiple, fluid, and relational production of masculinities that are influenced by the political, racial, gendered, religious, and class dynamics of specific localities, as well as global discourses and geopolitical strategies.4 Peter Hopkins’s (2008) work, for example, shows how the US-led war on terror has deeply impacted the formation of youthful Muslim masculinities and their everyday lives in Scotland, while Claire Dwyer, Bindi Shah, and Gurchathen Sanghera (2008) analyze the effects of the transformation of South Asian Muslim men’s image, from “cricket lover” to “terror suspect” in in the post–September 11 United Kingdom. Feminist political geography has been especially effective in noting theways that a national sense of insecurity is generated by political actors to shore up agendas, while human security is simultaneously undermined.5 Here, we train our eyes on embodied life as the site where nationalist and geopolitical conflicts are constituted through webs of affective relationships and mark certain bodies as threatening and fearsome. Barbara Spackman’s (1996) work on fascist virilities and Klaus Theweleit’s (1987) work on male fantasies point to a relationship between the politics of strongmen and gendered narratives around the creation of masculinity and the risks of the feminine. Theweleit connects military masculinity with violence, specifically fear-based hatred of women and femininity in the fantasies of the Freikorps, a volunteer army that fought internal revolution in interwar Germany. Many of the Freikorps would go on to Nazi leadership. In their narratives, Theweleit finds that female figures are the object of violence but violence that is imagined to be self-defense and linked to fears of dissolution—of society, of one’s own masculinity, and of the prospect of being overwhelmed, softened, dissolved. It is a masculinity that is both hard and violent but also quite fragile8. As Sara Ahmed (2004, 33) suggests, “the normative subject is often secured through narratives of injury: the white male subject, for example, has become an injured party in national discourses, ... as the one who has been hurt by the opening up of the nation to others.” The spread of this discourse is facilitated by the majority male subject’s access to resources and thus access to “the capacity to mobilise narratives of injury within the public domain” (33). The need for both the strong masculine figure and the victim narrative means that the figures to be protected are majority women; this enables men to both claim injury (to “their” women) but also claim the position of the strong though embattled savior. In these rhetorical moves, demographic fever dreams provide a similar fantasy world to fulfill the logics critiqued by scholars above, by rewriting histories and futures with majority figures centered as the true protagonists of history. The stories told by white nationalists in the United States and Europe, by Hindu nationalists in India, and by Erdoğan’s espousal of a vigorous and modern Sunni youth are stories in which the chaotic diversity of a multicultural world and the messiness of women and femininity are both backdrop and adversary in a story line centering strength and the masculine hero as the true protagonists of all stories. Here, the centering of one man as savior is not a fluke, a distraction, or a sideshow but is critical to the functioning of the dream.

#### **Traits associated with masculinity are glorified and encouraged in military institutions, specifically violence**

**Henry 17** – Marsha, Associate Professor in the Department of Gender Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, “Problematizing military masculinity, intersectionality and male vulnerability in feminist critical military studies”, 2017, Informa UK limited, “http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/79648/1/Henry\_Problematizing%20military%20masculinity\_2017.pdf”

First, two key works have influenced the development of the concept of militarised masculinity and masculinities, and I acknowledge the specific contribution of two scholars. First Enloe has encouraged scholars to pay attention to the process of militarisation rather than focus narrowly on the ideology of militarism in her ground-breaking work on gender and international relations (Enloe 1991). In this work, Enloe develops further her concept of military masculinity when thinking about the ways in which military institutions are sites of the production of both culture and gender. Here she suggests that gender roles are given opportunity and space to play out, as well as to produce extremes---hyper military masculinity being one example. She also points to the ways in which certain forms of martiality (exclusively associated with men) is hyper-valued within most societies and how this contributes to the glorification of men’s participation in violence and war. In thinking about military masculinity, it is not surprising then that feminist scholars such as Enloe, began to think about the process of socialising that takes place in militarised settings (Enloe 1983, 2000). Thus the social, constructed, contingent, fluid and multiple ways in which individuals are produced as gendered subjects, given a prescribed set of gendered roles, and how those individuals identify themselves, and perform gender within military institutions and settings has been afforded critical attention (Enloe 2000, Whitworth 2004, Higate 2003; Parpart 2015; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Belkin 2012). Early conceptualisations of military masculinity focussed almost exclusively on formal military settings---that is on national and state militaries. In general, military masculinity tends to be utilised in a range of feminist scholarship as a ‘thing’ that is carried, possessed or produced as an object through military socialisation and found within military culture (except Enloe 2003). As such, it was seen, in the early inception, as a singular form of gendered practice---following on from Connell’s early conceptualisations of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995, 2005). Of course the ways in which military masculinity has evolved as a conceptual lens and a site for empirical research means that there is no single definition, nor is it confined to feminist theorists alone. Military institutions now consistently analyse their own gendered and racialised cultures---although very often this is for improving efficiency and effectiveness in military operations. Further theorisations include that of Dudink, Hagemann and Tosh (2004) Parpart and Zalewski (2008) Belkin (2012), Whitworth (2004); Masters (2005); and Duncanson (2009, 2013, 2015). However, it was Paul Higate’s edited collection (2003) that took up the challenge of further theorising military masculinity. In particular the work engages with Connell and other masculinity scholars and succeeded in pluralising militarised masculinity. This work expanded the concept in such a way that scholars no longer talked about masculinity within military settings as something culturally specific, socially entrenched, pathological, or always already there in the same form--- rather Higate’s collection emphasises at how men [sic] become ‘manly’ warriors through twin processes of gender and military socialisation (ed. Higate 2003). The 2003 collection suggests that it is difficult to simply place the military and masculinity (in an additive way) together---rather both are mutually constituting. At times, in analyses it is difficult to pinpoint which is more influential--- military culture or gender culture! Importantly, Higate’s collection began to pave the way for thinking about militarised masculinities in non-traditional contexts. Thus, work on masculinity amongst rebel groups, militias, gangs, thugs, terrorists and jihadis began to be developed within this sub-field (Amar 2013; Rommell 2016). This challenged the idea that military values only belonged to fields where there was a formal military setting. More contemporary work is concerned with the drone operator, the military lawyer, the conscious objector and so on (Tidy 2015, 2015a). These two tracks of argument have been absolutely crucial to the conceptualisation and use of the term militarised masculinity/masculinities. This is because militarised masculinities mean that the fluid nature of militarisation and masculine socialisation in these frames allows scholars to focus on masculinities in practice and discourse. Rather than using militarised masculinity as an explanation for various negative developments within military settings, scholars are encouraged to probe deeper into what militarised masculinities look like and how they come into being. For example, in Stern and Ericsson-Baaz’s study of perpetrators of sexual violence, they focus on the discourses of perpetrators of sexual violence in the DRC construct as to their different motivations for such acts of brutality (Ericsson-Baaz and Stern 2012). In their research, they pay attention to the narrative strategies used by men to construct and produce themselves as fearsome and honourable military men despite admitting to being part of the perpetration of violence. Similarly, Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport in their work on models of masculinity in the Israeli context demonstrate the influence of nation on men’s different constructions of masculinity (Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport 2003). Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport view masculinities as being produced hierarchically in one military context, and as being influenced by very different military experiences (Russia and Israel). Both of these scholars’ use of militarised masculinity provide us with a more complex account of what motivates men to commit violence (organised or otherwise) in certain contexts, rather than assuming that it is merely an unintended consequence or unintentional by product of male embodiment or male sex roles and military culture. Thus the work of Cynthia Enloe in challenging understandings of militarisation, and Higate’s edited collection on militarised masculinities was a catalyst for rethinking military masculinities and masculinities in conflict (Kirby and Henry 2012). This is turn led to the development of work examining a range of masculinities within militarised (and not only military) settings—in particular Belkin’s work Bring Me Men, was seminal in challenging the idea that military masculinity is a singular and homogenous outcome of military socialisation and/or military culture and that it is always constructed in opposition to femininity and/or heteronormativity. Titinuk’s challenge to narrow definitions of military masculinity (2012) went some way to challenge any tendency towards simplistic or pathological definitions by demonstrating that military organisations also revere various personal characteristics traditionally associated with femininity such as sacrifice, compassion and cooperation. Thus militarised masculinities are not constructed purely on the disavowal of all that is feminine or associated with women. This led to two further developments. The first was a minor interest in female military masculinities (Tasker 2011). Tasker used the portrayal of female soldiers in Hollywood films to reconceptualise military masculinity without the male body---influenced by Halberstam’s work on female masculinities more generally (Halberstam 1998). Tasker takes Halberstam’s conceptualisation of non-normative gender and sexuality is applied to female soldiers who are depicted as occupying a parodic, mimicking or inauthentic military masculinity. In the films Courage Under Fire and GI Jane, Tasker finds evidence of military masculine space where women are able to perform gender in both conventional and unconventional ways. Actress Demi Moore, for example, labours to shed her ‘femininity’ by shaving her head and wearing an undershirt traditionally seen as men’s attire, in order to be accepted as a legitimate soldier. Moore’s character is finally accepted as a legitimate man amongst her male military peers, after she demonstrates her ability to be ‘just like the men’ in her squad. This work contests the scope of military masculinities by insisting not only on their plurality, but by questioning the very constitution and production of masculinity as a social expression of gender. The other development is found in work examining both military femininity (Ombati 2015) and masculinity, as Dietrich does in her 2012 piece on militarisation in Peru, El Salvador and Colombia. This work, along with that of scholars such Myrttinen (2013); Parpart (2016); Maringira (2015) and Stachowitsch (2015) begins to pay attention to internal differences and inequalities amongst men. What these more recent works suggest is that the study of militarised masculinities has expanded considerably and draws on a range of concepts and theories. This is why it is unsurprising that intersectionality has appeared in the literature. Masculinity scholars have looked towards feminist theory for some time now, and in order to understand the complex theoretical terrain of military and militarised masculinities, scholars have turned to ‘classic’ texts, including that by Crenshaw and other intersectional theorists. As such, it is not surprising that the intersectional ‘turn’ should now make headway within the study of men, masculinities and the military

#### Masculine imagery ensures nuclear priesthood – causes the normalization of nuclear use

Blanchard 14 (Eric M., Adjunct Assistant Professor Columbia University, “Rethinking International Security: Masculinity in World Politics”, Fall/Winter 2014, The Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2014), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24591031>, pd)

Gender scholars have demonstrated how masculinity affects foreign policy planning and decision making among security elites and small advisory groups as well as sub-state militias. Though it does not explore the group's dynamics, Carol Cohn s classic investigation of Cold War defense intellectuals demonstrates the importance of masculine club mentality. The "nuclear priesthood" of men charged with crafting U.S. nuclear strategy shared a language of abstraction and masculine imagery that normalized, sanitized, and legitimized the discussion of mass killing, leaving them detached from the realities of the potential use of nuclear weapons.39 Relatedly, Robert Dean shows how President Kennedy surrounded himself with elite advisors who were shaped by and drew upon institutionalized ideals of masculinity to form a privileged "brotherhood." These gendered ideals intersected significantly with class: the exclusively male boarding schools these men had attended were seen by parents as paths to help their sons overcome upper-class effeminacy. The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), the elite all-male group of national security advisors Kennedy gathered to manage the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oc tober 1962, was an assembly of warrior-intellectuals credentialed through the process of passing through such boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities, and clubs; validated by voluntary military service; and mentored by men "connected across generations by institutional ties of patronage, class tradition, education, and fraternalism" and "bound together by a common conception of patrician 'manliness' and heroism."4 A focus on the role of masculinity within another type of small group, autonomous nationalist militias such as the ones that participated in sexual violence atrocities committed in Bosnia in the 1990s, or more recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reveals the roles of masculine hierarchies and frustrations related to unachievable and idealized militarized masculinity. Enloe's analysis of interviews conducted with men accused of raping and kill ing Bosnian Muslim women in the 1990s revealed hierarchies among Serbian militia, illustrating how systematic rape during wartime is "fueled" by inter-male relations.41 Members of militia groups in the DRC were asked to explain the way they justified and normalized sexual violence. Their answers relied upon logics derived from discourses of masculinity and femininity, inculcated in part by the institutional promotion of ideals, such as the "(hetero)sexually potent male fighter," that code certain types of rape as inevitable and a result of the sexual needs of the soldiers, while others are seen as less legitimate deviant expressions of frustrations due to wartime circumstances.42 These soldiers "explicitly their rationale for rape with their inabilities (or 'failures') to inhabit certain idealized notions of heterosexual manhood," including that of the eco provider, seen as legitimately dominant in their households.43 Sub-state Bureaucracies and Organizations Militaries are among the most significant domestic-level organizations and have been a prominent focus of gender and masculinity research. Feminist IR scholarship has highlighted "the way the military functions in our societies] as a central guarantor and producer of masculinity."44 The tenuousness of the military's production of official masculine legitimacy is signaled by military efforts to exclude gay and female soldiers using ostensible morale and unit cohesion concerns to camouflage anxieties over "maintaining the institution's heterosexual masculinity."45 The dependence of military organizations and bureaucracies on the con struction of a variety of military masculinities is evident from their recruitment strategies and organizational structures. There is a complex relationship between militarism, masculinity, and military recruitment strategies.46 Melissa T. Brown ™ discusses the variety of masculine constructions underwriting American military recruitment campaigns in the wake of the end of the draft and inception of the all-volunteer force. Brown argues that recruitment materials for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force evoke varied masculinity types, not just traditional war rior masculinity, tailoring their appeals to meet particular recruitment targets depending on the branches' needs for combat-related or technical skills, for women and military careerists, or for larger or smaller numbers of recruits.47 The importance of masculinity extends beyond the recruiting stage to the organization of state militaries, distinct from the smaller, non-state militias - ... . discussed previously. Connell has argued that internal masculine hierarchies, “physically violent but subordinate to orders on the one hand, and dominating and organizationally competent on the other" are foundational to military organization.48 In these organizations, occupational status and career advancement cannot be disentangled from the operation of masculinity. This is seen, for example, in the way U.S. Navy personnel draw upon different elements of a menu of masculine qualities to navigate the branch's competitive atmosphere and advance their careers. Lower-status supply officers (tasked with administration, inventory, and accounting), who are excluded from the risk-taking behavior and autonomy reserved for high-status pilots and Naval aviators, distinguish themselves by emphasizing the professionalized technical rationality, efficiency, and responsibility in their roles.49 Pressure on these officers is attenuated by the Navy's organizational culture of constant evaluation and competitive testing that demands officers continually demonstrate their masculinity and avoid acquiring a reputation for failure. This masculine competition has spillover effects outside the organization. According to the Department of Defenses "Tailhook Report" issued in 1993, Navy members' notorious behavior (including the sexual ha rassment and assault of female naval officers) in a convention hotel was also an outgrowth of competition between units of the Navy.50 At this level, IR scholars typically focus on the impact of the internal workings of the nation-state, including factors such as domestic politics, the character of a state's political-economic system (or regime type such as democratic or authori tarian), culture, nationalism, the role of interest groups, and public opinion. The number of powerful critiques concerning security and the state provided by feminists is too voluminous to summarize.51 Relative to the volume of main stream scholarship on the state level, feminists have paid less attention to the possible relationship between gender and the democratic peace—the influential thesis that democracies rarely fight other democracies but can be quite belligerent in their dealings with non-democracies. Thus, feminists left it to non-feminists such as Francis Fukuyama to speculate, without evidence, that "feminized" de veloped democracies, where women's political participation has expanded, are more peaceful than authoritarian states, and thus vulnerable to prédations of more masculinized states.52 Feminists have, however, problematized both this posited relationship between women and peace and the common link between alleged peacefulness of democratization and women's political participation.53 Like feminists, masculinity theorists have noted that the institutions that make up the state have been subject to male domination and continue to remain so. The link between nationhood and manhood and the centrality of masculinity to nationalism are stressed by masculinity scholars who point to the value nationalist movements place on terms such as honor, bravery, cowardice, duty, and patriotism, which "are hard to distinguish as either nationalistic or mascu linist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness. Furthermore, the way nationalist movements reflect "a masculinist definition of femininity and of women's proper place in the nation" relegates women to the roles of mothers and symbols of national honor." At this level, analysis shows how the operations of masculinity in the domes¬tic political space help account for various types of state behavior. For example, U.S. gender dynamics before the Spanish–American war provide a window into the relationship between gendered domestic political pressures, pre- vailing notions of masculinity and leadership, and the decision to en-gage in war. Masculine political culture is a resource for leaders looking to characterize the threat posed by other states. In the late nineteenth century, a variety of factors combined to pose a threat to champions of a "manly ideal of politics" and martial conceptions of citizenship. Such factors included the U.S. political climate at the time, the depression of 1893, the closing of the Western frontier, and more assertive, activist female political participation (presaging a possible feminization of politics)." For jingos (those advocating for war with Spain) of the 1890s, the answer to these threats was to go to war as a way of "inculcating manhood."" Domestic calls for war to avenge the sinking of the battleship Maine eventually pressured U.S. President William McKinley 72 to declare war on Spain, illustrating the extent to which the president's political authority was—and still is—predicated upon martial masculinity. Masculine imagery in a domestic political culture—including media, fic-tion, and films—also impacts the evolution of alliance formation between states. For example, Michelle Mart historicizes the close ties between the United States and Israel by analyzing cultural constructions of Israel throughout the 1940s and 1950s.57 Once stereotyped as cowards and passive victims of the Holocaust, Israeli Jews were reimaged during the Cold War struggle as masculine insiders worthy of being allies. Enhanced by Israel's military successes, images of Israe¬lis as tough pioneers, gutsy underdogs, and citizen soldiers were posed against increasingly unmasculine representations of Arab outsiders in a manner that enhanced Israel's perceived value as a U.S. ally.

#### Hegemonic masculinity sustains historical inequality

DiGioia, Amanda, 12 October 2020 “Duelling, the Russian Cultural Imagination, and Masculinity in Crisis” <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.4324/9780429331459>

Traditionally, the study of men has been called ‘history’, but there are also intersections between studying men and studying gender. For over thirty years, the study of gender has encompassed the study of both men and masculinities. Men and masculinities are shaped by differences of age, class, and ethnicity, and exist among other social differences (Kimmel et al., 2005, p. 3). There is also evidence that masculinity can be transgressed (Beasley, 2015; McGuffey & Rich, 1999; Surkis, 1996; Tsirigotis, 2017). However, toxic masculinity (and, by extension, duelling) is not transgressive; instead, it adheres to and upholds those norms.

Masculinity has been the subject of much previous scholarship, and contemporary masculinity scholarship is heavily influenced by a single theoretical framework established by Raewyn Connell. Connell’s theory acknowledges that while masculinities vary across time, culture, and individuals, there has been a practice (hegemonic masculinity) that legitimises men’s position as dominant in society (androcentrism), while subordinating women and men from marginalised groups (Connell, 1995). Hegemonic masculinity may explain why men maintain positions of power, because women, marginalised men (those in the LGBTIQA+ community, people of colour, Jewish men, etc.), and those of other genders are subsequently coded as female or women (Connell, 1995). An integral part of the continuing appeal of Connell’s theory is that the theory itself provides a critical feminist analysis of historically specific masculinities while at the same time recognising the various extents to which individual men contribute to its propagation. Finally, Connell notes that hegemonic masculinity is the currently accepted strategy in human societies, acknowledging that hegemonic masculinity can be challenged, changed, and usurped (Connell, 1995).

Some scholars argue that the theory behind hegemonic masculinity has become associated with ‘negative characteristics that depict men as unemotional, independent, nonnurturing, aggressive, and dispassionate’, which are then seen as the causes of criminal behaviour, while ignoring the ‘positive’ behaviour of men (Collier, 1998, pp. 1–29). Other scholars criticise the drift of hegemonic masculinity, suggesting that any contemporary trouble is now blamed on toxic masculinity (Martin, 1998). One academic argues that ‘defending gun ownership is a defence of hegemonic masculinity’ (Martin, 1998, p. 474), an equivalency that may serve as an example of what Collier (1998) deems an overreach. However, recent research has indicated that there is indeed a connection between hegemonic masculinity and carrying a concealed firearm, as part of the appeal of so doing is that it allows the man to identify with hegemonic masculinity through fantasies of violence, self-defence, or defending their spouse and/or children (Stroud, 2012, p. 216).

## FW

#### Framework: Equality is not achieved purely by an increase in women in power but with a change in the system itself. Instead of focusing on individual’s positions the neg focuses on the bigger picture and calls out institutions. A feminist lens provides the ability to cause a structural change in an inherently masculine system. The alt solves hierarchies of hegemonic masculinity

**Tickner 92’ –** [**J. Ann,**[feminist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism_(international_relations)) theorist distinguished scholar in residence at the School of International Services, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security”, Columbia University Press]

Since, as I have suggested, the world of international politics is a masculine domain, how could feminist perspectives contribute anything new to its academic discourses? Many male scholars have already noted that, given our current technologies of destruction and the high degree of economic inequality and environmental degradation that now exists, we are desperately in need of changes in the way world politics is conducted; many of them are attempting to prescribe such changes. For the most part, however, these critics have ignored the extent to which the values and assumptions that drive our contemporary international system are intrinsically related to concepts of masculinity; privileging these values constrains the options available to states and their policymakers. All knowledge is partial and is a function of the knower's lived experience in the world. Since knowledge about the behavior of states in the international system depends on assumptions that come out of men's experiences, it ignores a large body of human experience that has the potential for increasing the range of options and opening up new ways of thinking about interstate practices. Theoretical perspectives that depend on a broader range of human experience are important for women and men alike, as we seek new ways of thinking about our contemporary dilemmas. Conventional international relations theory has concentrated on the activities of the great powers at the center of the system. Feminist theories, which speak out of the various experiences of women-- who are usually on the margins of society and interstate politics-- can offer us some new insights on the behavior of states and the needs of individuals, particularly those on the peripheries of the international system. Feminist perspectives, constructed out of the experiences of women, can add a new dimension to our understanding of the world economy; since women are frequently the first casualties in times of economic hardship, we might also gain some new insight into the relationship between militarism and structural violence. However, f**eminist theories must go beyond injecting women's experiences into different disciplines and attempt to challenge the core concepts of the disciplines themselves**. Concepts central to international relations theory and practice, such as power, sovereignty, and security, have been framed in terms that we associate with masculinity. Drawing on feminist theories to examine and critique the meaning of these and other concepts fundamental to international politics could help us to reformulate these concepts in ways that might allow us to see new possibilities for solving our current insecurities. Suggesting that the personal is political, feminist scholars have brought to our attention distinctions between public and private in the domestic polity: examining these artificial boundary distinctions in the domestic polity could shed new light on international boundaries, such as those between anarchy and order, which are so fundamental to the conceptual framework of realist discourse. Most contemporary feminist perspectives take the gender inequalities that I have described above as a basic assumption. Feminists in various disciplines claim that feminist theories, by revealing and challenging these gender hierarchies, have the potential to transform disciplinary paradigms. By introducing gender into the discipline of **I**nternational **Rel**ations, I hope to challenge the way in which the field has traditionally been constructed and to examine the extent to which the practices of international politics are related to these gender inequalities. The construction of hierarchical binary oppositions has been central to theorizing about international relations. 29 Distinctions between domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, and center and periphery have served as important assumptions in theory construction and as organizing principles for the way we view the world. Just as realists center their explanations on the hierarchical relations between states and Marxists on unequal class relations, feminists can bring to light gender hierarchies embedded in the theories and practices of world politics and allow us to see the extent to which all these systems of domination are interrelated. As Sarah Brown argues, a feminist theory of international relations is an act of political commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated. "There is the need to identify the as yet unspecified relation between the construction of power and the construction of gender in international relations." 30 Acknowledging, as most feminist theories do, that these hierarchies are socially constructed, also allows us to envisage conditions necessary for their transcendence.

#### Sexism or hegemonic masculinity dominates politics and devalues both femininity's values and international relationship in order to sustain gender hierarchical politics. A reformation to politics is needed for liberating females from gender opposition.

**Tickner 92**   - (J.Ann, Distinguished Scholar in Residence School of International Service,*“Engendered Insecurities Feminist Perspectives on International Relations,” Gender in International Politics,* New York: Columbia)

**Hegemonic masculinity is sustained through its opposition to various subordinated and devalued** masculinities, such as homosexuality, and, more important, through **its relation to various devalued femininities**. Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men's stated superiority. Nowhere in the public realm are these stereotypical gender images more apparent than in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy.

          Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity depends on its opposition to an unequal relationship with various subordinated femininities. Many contemporary feminists draw on similarly socially constructed, or engendered, relationships in their definition of gender difference. Historically, differences between men and women have usually been ascribed to biology. But when feminists use the term gender today, they are not generally referring to biological differences between males and females, but to a set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. These characteristics can and do vary across time and place. In this view, biology may constrain behavior, but it should not be used "deterministically" or "naturally" to justify practices, institutions, or choices that could be other than they are. While what it means to be a man or a woman varies across cultures and history, in most cultures gender differences signify relationships of inequality and the domination of women by men.

          Joan Scott similarly characterizes gender as "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and... a primary way of signifying relationships of power." 7 Indeed one could characterize most contemporary feminist scholarship in terms of the dual beliefs that gender difference has played an important and essential role in the structuring of social inequalities in much of human history and that the resulting differences in self-identifications, human understandings, social status, and power relationships are unjustified.

            Scott claims that **the way in which our understanding of gender signifies relationships of power is through a set of** normative concepts that set forth **interpretations of the meanings of symbols.** In Western culture, these concepts take the form of fixed binary oppositions that categorically **assert the meaning of masculine and feminine and hence legitimize a set of unequal social relationships.** 8 Scott and many other contemporary feminists assert that, through our use of language, we come to perceive the world through these binary oppositions. Our Western understanding of gender is based on a set of culturally determined binary distinctions, such as public versus private, objective versus subjective, self versus other, reason versus emotion, autonomy versus relatedness, and culture versus nature; the first of each pair of characteristics is typically associated with masculinity, the second with femininity. 9 Scott claims that **the hierarchical construction of these distinctions can take on a fixed**  and permanent quality that perpetuates women's oppression: therefore they must be challenged. To do so we must analyze the way these binary oppositions operate in different contexts and, rather than accepting them as fixed, seek to displace their hierarchical construction. 10 When many of these differences between women and men are no longer assumed to be natural or fixed, we can examine how relations of gender inequality are constructed and sustained in various arenas of public and private life. In committing itself to gender as a category of analysis, contemporary feminism also commits itself to gender equality as a social goal.

           Extending Scott's challenge to the field of **international relations, we can** immediately **detect a similar set Gender in association of international politics with the masculine characteristics described above**, the field of international relations is one of the last of the social sciences to be touched by gender analysis and feminist perspectives. 11 The reason for this, I believe, is not that the field is gender neutral, meaning that the introduction of gender is irrelevant to its subject matter as many scholars believe, but that it **is so thoroughly masculinized that the workings of these hierarchical gender relations are hidden.**

#### Politicians valorize masculinity in politics and oppress women and feminism. Politics are always seen as masculine.

**Löffler et al. 20** [Marion, Department of Political Science University of Vienna, “Political Masculinities and Populism”, NORMA]

Politics is most often conceived of as a gender-neutral practice guided by rationality. Yet, as is the case more generally in society, masculinity operates as a hidden (human) norm structuring politics. As the ‘unmarked’ gender category, its influence has remained hidden from critical enquiry. However, since the early 1990s, a growing body of literature in masculinity studies generally, and masculinities in politics in particular, has debunked the myth of the gender-neutrality of politics and made masculinity visible (see Starck & Sauer, 2014). As is the case in masculinity studies, right-wing populist discourse currently refutes the rational and gender-neutral image of politics. Yet unlike masculinity studies, masculinity is not open to critical enquiry among right-wing populists. Rather, populist politicians such as Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin promote and valorize the relationship between masculinity and politics (Boatright & Sperling, 2020; Sperling, 2015). Newly emerging versions of right-wing populism have been described as being misogynist and sexist: they oppose feminism and gender-equality measures, same-sex marriage and gender studies; they seek to re-instantiate traditional family and associated gender roles; and they pursue a strong-man style of political leadership (Dietze, 2018, p. 34; Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 7; Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic, & Sauer, 2018; Mayer, Sori, & Sauer, 2016; Norocel, 2013, p. 5). At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the seeming ‘gender traditionalism’ of populism (Sauer, Kuhar, Ajanovic, & Saarinen, 2016) is undercut by the existence of female leaders of populist parties and populists’ appeals to European values of gender-equality and emancipation (Akkerman, 2015; Dietze, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic, & Sauer, 2014). This special issue contributes to the debate on gender and populism by focusing on the relationship between the concepts of political masculinities and populism. It developed from a conference on Political Masculinities and Populism, hosted by the Political Masculinities Network in December 2017, and based at the University of Koblenz-Landau. The research network was established in 2012. It aimed to bring scholars together, from different disciplines, who hold a common interest in the political dimensions of masculinities. The Political Masculinities Network merged with the Uppsala network on Men in Politics in 2018. This research network is committed to critical research on political masculinities and seeks to encourage a broad church of cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary debate with the aim of comparing, contrasting, and where possible integrating different modes of understanding and related findings from across academic disciplines. The special issue contributes toward this project. We provide a brief overview to this topic in this introductory paper. The concept of populism Populism is a contested concept (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). It is frequently used in media and political debate but difficult to define as an analytical concept. The term refers to different and conflicting political groups and projects. Whilst in Europe it is most often associated with the (radical) political right, the United States have a tradition of ‘liberal populism’, an expression, which in Europe would be ‘a blatant contradiction’ (Müller, 2016, p. 9). Populism has also been linked with left-wing politics, especially in South American and southern European countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), whereas some populist movements are best described as hybrid in combining elements of left and right (Brubaker, 2017, p. 358f.). Moreover, their social basis may be agrarian or urban; their economic policies protectionist and state-centred or neoliberal and market-centred; they may be secular or religious; and they may celebrate cultural liberalism or attack it. Populist politicians may be challengers or incumbents seeking to mobilize or demobilize. Consequently, scholars from different backgrounds use the term to describe different phenomena, which in turn have inspired different analytical approaches. For instance, the study of populism in Latin America focuses predominantly on economic and organizational aspects of populism, while European scholars use to stress the political and ideological aspects (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17f.) In seeking to define the concept of populism, the only common basis for doing so is that all populist movements, parties, figures, and regimes claim to speak in the name of ‘the people’ against various ‘elites’ (Brubaker, 2017, p. 359; Müller, 2016, p. 20). However, speaking in the name of the people is assumed in modern democracies, and not confined to populists. Further disagreements in definition ensue where some scholars see populism as an ideology of democracy (Canovan, 2002), while others view it as intrinsically anti-democratic, as ‘a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures of [electoral-representative] democracy’ (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 265). Yet others see its effect as enabling democratization processes or contributing to the dismantling of democracy, depending on the type of populism and on the political system in which it occurs (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 86). This reveals the ambiguity of the concept of democracy and its defining notion of ‘the people’ shifting between meanings of them as ordinary (plebs), as sovereign (demos), and as culturally or ethnically distinct (nation or ethnos). Therefore, ‘the people’, though crucial for democracy, is essentially an empty signifier (Laclau, 2007), which comes to represent something different across cultural, historical, political and regional contexts. Although populism as an analytical concept is contested, we agree with Rogers Brubaker (2017, p. 358) that it is indispensable in understanding the current ‘populist moment’. Moreover, many scholars on populism agree that a key feature of populists is their claim to be the ‘true democrats’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4) by not only claiming to speak in the name of ‘the people’, but the whole people, following ‘the idea that it’s possible for the people to be one and – all of them – to have one true representative’ (Müller, 2016, p. 20). Populists combine this with a further claim that the current political establishment fails to represent ‘the people’, or more specifically, the general will of ‘the people’ (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p. 61). Central to the populist claim is the notion that ‘the people’ does not equate with the citizenry of a country, but refers to an imagined ‘heartland’ of a virtuous, pure and uncorrupted population (Taggart, 2000, p. 95). These notions are in line with the definition of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544), which considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2014; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 18). In understanding populism (‘us vs. them’) as ‘thin-centred’, it cannot stand alone, but is always in need of a host ideology, which can be either right- or left-wing. This minimal definition of populism is consistent with the analytical approaches that are applied in the papers included in this special issue. They study populism, for example, as a political style (see Löffler) or as discourse generating heterogeneous and inconsistent messages (see Wiedlack). They analyse the persona of a populist leader (see Starck) or emphasis on how Weber’s notion of charisma contains populist claims to being against elites (see Geva). And finally, they problematize the relationship between right-wing populism and minority groups (see Lobban et al.). Populism and gender There is an extensive literature discussing gender and populism. The following overview is not intended to be exhaustive, but to illustrate the research perspectives of this still growing field of research. Recent research on populism and gender focuses on a wide range of individual, political and social processes including, for example, the representation of women in populist parties (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), their performance (e.g. Norocel, 2018) and leadership (e.g. Meret, Siim, & Pingaud, 2017); on the gender and the psychological characteristics of populist supporters (e.g. Coffé, 2018) as well as gendered voting behaviour (e.g. Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 2017); on the (anti-feminist) gender ideologies of right-wing populist actors (e.g. Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Kováts, 2018) and their conservative gender (family) policies (e.g. Akkerman, 2015). With regard to the prominence afforded women in left- and right-wing populist parties, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) challenge the Männerparteien thesis (‘men’s parties’) formulated by Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002). They argue that while right-wing populist parties in Northern Europe perform on average worse than other political parties, even if they have a female leader, left-wing populist parties in South America seem to be progressive. However, the difference relates to the cultural context, a highly emancipated society in Northern Europe and strongly patriarchal societies in South America (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17). Yet the degree to which a party may be considered progressive may not necessarily be determined by women’s political prominence (Caravantes, 2019; Norocel, 2018). The cult of personality around populist leaders contributes to the masculinization of politics. The charismatic leader is frequently seen as a feature of populism (e.g. Taggart, 2000); though gender neutral, the descriptions of charisma often reveal framings that feature predominantly masculine attributes (Meret, 2015, p. 83). This leader is usually portrayed as a masculine and potentially violent ‘strongman’, ruling on the basis of ‘a cult of a leader’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 63). Thus, there is an emphasis on action and the courage to take difficult decisions, which relies on anti- intellectualism and urgency and exemplified by the leader’s virility, the use of simple and vulgar language, and, of course, the leader’s charisma (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 64–68). As noted above, research has pointed to a gender paradox, namely the existence of populist ‘men’s parties with women leaders’ (Meret et al., 2017). Female populist leaders such as Eva Peron (Argentina), Pia Kjærsgaard (Denmark), Marine LePen (France), Sarah Palin (United States) or Alice Weidel (Germany) question the taken-for-granted masculine qualities of populist leaders and populism as well as, indeed, masculinities themselves. Gender research on (Northern and Central) Europe often focuses on the populist radical right parties (Akkerman, 2015; de Lange & Mügge, 2015; Mayer et al., 2018; Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015) that emerged as a political force since the 1980s (Mudde, 2004). Populist radical right parties are characterized by their opposition to immigration as their most salient and most successfully exploited issue. Consequently, they do not only construct an ideological difference between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, but also between ‘the people’ as insiders and ‘others’ (outsiders) who pose a threat to ‘the people’. Since 2001, Islam has been singled out as the main threat. Examining the vote for populist radical right parties, a gender gap has been observed where more men than women are supportive of them (Harteveld, Van Der Brug, Dahlberg, & Kokkonen, 2015). However, the most important reason reported in individuals supporting populist radical right parties remains the same for men and women – namely their opposition to immigration (Spierings et al., 2015). The gender gap in voting for right-wing populists is often overemphasized (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015) and reproduces the notion of tolerant women vs. intolerant men. Yet we witnessed a large proportion of women voting for the 45th President of the United States. Moreover, there have been other minority group movements who espouse support for right-wing populists such as ‘Gays for Trump’ and ‘Alternative Homosexuals’ who are part of the German right populist AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). Populist radical right parties often hold contradictory gender ideological views (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Dietze, 2018). They typically emphasize the traditional family and gender roles as core institutions of society and oppose same-sex marriage as well as abortion. But in debates concerning immigration, in contrast, populist radical right parties have adopted more liberal views of gender relations by emphasizing gender equality, women’s rights and freedom of choice (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40; Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). This apparent contradiction, between the ‘liberal’ defence of gender equality in debates on immigration on the one hand, and the ‘conservative’ defence of the traditional family and gender roles on the other, has been explained by discursive shifts in populist rhetoric when constructing ‘others’ – ‘those up there’ (the elite) or ‘not us’ (Muslim immigrants) (Mayer et al., 2014). Many right-wing populists support movements against gender equality, which have been understood as a conservative backlash against levels of equality achieved between women and men and/or LGBTQ rights (Kováts, 2018, p. 529). Most right-wing populist parties do not only support traditional gender norms, but hold essentialist notions of gender as determined by sex. They conceive of feminism as a threat to the ‘natural’ division of the sexes, and hence, oppose policies that promote gender equality. This is seen, for example, in their frequent demand to have gender studies removed from university curricula (Küpper, 2018; Mayer et al., 2018). However, ‘gender’ also stands in as a placeholder or empty signifier. As discussed at the European Conference of Gender and Politics in 2019, in Poland and other post-communist European countries, gender equality is sometimes framed as ‘communist’ and therefore ‘anti-democratic’. This perspective fuels the populist claim that gender equality measures are an elitist ideology working against ‘the people’. In right-wing populist discourse ‘the people’ is constructed in terms of biological essentialism (Mayer et al., 2016), based on the idea of the traditional conjugal family as the natural cornerstone to society, as well as the pre-eminence of men and masculinities in politics (Kreisky, 2014). Political masculinities In contrast to the construction of men and masculinity in populist political discourse, we suggest elaborating a concept of ‘political masculinities’ that can inform critical gender research. In order to facilitate cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary dialogue, Kathleen Starck and Birgit Sauer propose a broad definition of political masculinity, which encompasses any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by ‘political players’. These shall be individuals or groups of persons who are part of or associated with the ‘political domain’, i.e. professional politicians, party members, members of the military as well as citizens and members of political movements claiming or gaining political rights. (Starck & Sauer, 2014, p. 6). This broad definition of political masculinity has served as a foundation for a growing body of work, fostering dialogue between a wide range of disciplines, on topics as diverse as political masculinities’ involvement with, and associated tensions in, prevention of violence against women initiatives in the United Kingdom (Burrell, 2020); political masculinities in parliamentary debates during Austria’s period of postwar nation-building (Löffler, 2019); the Indian state’s intervention, along with the role played by both state and non-state political masculinities, in practices of sex selection (Rahm, 2019); and the political masculinities of pro-feminist men involved in an Israeli high school gender equality intervention programme (Schwartz, 2020). These, and other studies, have contributed toward developing the concept of political masculinity/ies. A few key observations are useful in this respect. Starck and Luyt (2019) recognize that the original definition particularly speaks to masculinities that are more overtly, or easily recognized, as political (e.g. professional politicians). Yet they stress the importance of including individuals, groups, practices or representations of those whose impact on or within the political sphere is less easily identified (e.g. citizens, media tycoons, global businessmen/women). This allows us to scrutinize the dynamics of interactions between a wide range of ‘political players’ and masculinities, an indispensable focus for analysing change in gender relations. Political masculinities are crucial in the reproduction of power relations. However, the concepts of gender and masculinities include dimensions of power. Masculinity is therefore always political. While gender and masculinities are inextricably political concepts in the production and reproduction of power, it is argued that the concept of political masculinities holds particular use in ‘instances in which power is explicitly either being (re)produced or challenged’ (Starck & Luyt, 2019, p. 435). We see the reproduction of power through political masculinities clearly in the contributions toward this special issue. For example, Dorit Geva describes how Marine Le Pen draws on charisma, as a characteristic of political masculinity that is not in conflict with notions of political femininity in France, in order to further her political influence; Marion Löffler demonstrates that masculinities exist as a symbolic resource that is flexibly drawn upon by political actors in Austria to further their political advantage; whilst Kathleen Starck similarly identifies Nigel Farage’s (United Kingdom) active construction of his persona to incorporate different representations of masculinity in order to appeal to a wide national audience.

## At: Perm

**Embracing a feminist method that rejects liberal assumptions key to solve fascism and war**

**Quinn 19-** (Erin, Graduate student at University of London, *Why Our Feminism Must be Anti-Facist,* Publisher: Centre for Gender Studies.)

SOAS’ Centre for Gender Studies concluded its seminar series for the term on Thursday, December 13th, with a discussion of the relationship between feminism and anti-fascism with activists from Sisters Uncut, a feminist direct action group fighting in solidarity with survivors of domestic, sexual, and state violence, and Brazilian Women Against Fascism UK.

The panel discussed the rise of fascism in the UK and around the globe, connected solidarity against oppression and state violence, and highlighted the challenges facing feminist activists. The rise of figures like new president-elect of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and Boris Johnson fuel normalize fascist **discourse, expanding violence.** Within this context, the panel was a poignant and timely reminder that **feminism must be grounded in anti-fascism, and anti-fascism must be grounded in feminism.**

As an activist from Sisters Uncut emphasized, austerity cuts that often accompany far-right governments are targeted at marginalized communities, and affect women of color disproportionately. Attacks on marginalized communities are a central tenet of fascism that grounds itself in a divisive and violent discourse of “us” versus “them”. The consequences of this discourse are played out transnationally. As one Brazilian panelist emphasized, this is playing out now In Brazil, where since the election in October attacks against LGBTQ persons have greatly intensified.

One of the commonalities highlighted between Brazil and the UK was the part that the liberal rights framework and liberal feminists play in the reproduction of far-right and state violence, and their role in the **normalization of fascist discourse and “dialogue” between “equal sides**”. As one of the Brazilian activists highlighted, transnationally, the left has been disorganized; it has not done enough and has allowed fascism to flourish. In Brazil, the Black Indigenous movement has always had to fight for survival within liberal feminism. In a country where a Black youth is killed every 23 minutes, the priority is one of survival, not of rights. Liberal feminists see the value of structures and institutions, like for example the criminal justice system, which itself is founded on ideals of white supremacy and capitalism. However, as one of the activists from Sisters Uncut stressed, the entire state and economic system is built on oppression, especially the oppression of communities of color; these systems were designed to function on and profit off of inequality. Therefore, although liberal rights “gains” may provide greater access to resources and “equality” for some communities, alternative radical systematic change will be required to produce any type of real equality.

The panelists emphasized that persistence is necessary. Thinking beyond structures, imagining future alternatives by reflecting on past work, and being receptive to tensions **within movements is necessary to continue to fight and resist state and fascist** narratives. Ultimately, the panel underscored the role feminists have played in the resistance against power structures in the past and in the present, and challenged those in the audience to show up not just for panel discussions, but for the rallies, the protests, and the organizing meetings.

# \*\*\*AFF – Fem IR/Gender

## At: Cap K

### Perm

#### Socialism and feminism are interconnected and there is still progress to be made on the basis of equality

Simone **Morgen 14** [For a Feminist Socialism - Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) (dsausa.org)](https://www.dsausa.org/democratic-left/for_a_feminist_socialism/)Simone Morgenis an officer of Democratic Socialists of Central Ohio, a branch of Democratic Socialists of America. She is a long-time volunteer and activist with Jobs with Justice and numerous other groups, including more recently [USUncut](https://www.keywiki.org/index.php?title=USUncut&action=edit&redlink=1) and immigrant support groupsIn 2012, she was Constituent Liaison at the State of Ohio - AG office.

Why, indeed? Isn’t Rosa Luxemburg a socialist icon? Don’t socialism’s core values of equal treatment of all persons, without prejudice or disparate treatment, address feminist concerns?

Formally, yes – but a cursory examination of the ways in which issues are addressed even within socialist circles brings this into question. Even in these more favorable environs, the need for an explicitly feminist view remains. After all, patriarchy as a sex/gender system of organizing society existed long before the capitalist mode of production revolutionized society and colored its directives. **How would feminism change our common vision?** Most obviously, feminist socialism recognizes that work and economics are different for men and women and takes that into account. Too often, socialists overlook the fact that women’s earnings trail men’s for many reasons. These include 1) their greater representation in low-wage jobs; 2) greater numbers in government jobs, which have been getting cut due to the recession and attacks on public sector workers; and 3) lifetime lower earnings, due to a pay differential that has hardly moved in the past 10 years. Outside the formal economy, women also do the vast majority of un-waged work, whether in the home or the informal economy. A feminist socialist vision recognizes the immense unpaid labor that sustains the capitalist economy and the need to address it when developing an alternative, so that the burden of holding up family and community doesn’t fall disproportionately on women yet again. **Why is this critical fact so often overlooked by socialists who lack a feminist analysis?**

First**,**because identifying specific disadvantaged groups based on color, country of origin, ethnicity, etc. involves defining those groupings by their characteristics and often by location and/or proximity. Women, by contrast, are a worldwide group that encompasses any or all characteristics, and are always present – that is, they are visible and not visible. This results from their daily interaction with men as wives, mothers, employees, etc., in both public and private life, rather than as a discrete racial or ethnic group that specific people may not encounter on a regular basis. Women are thus not recognized as a class, either economically or politically.

Second**,**many socialists think in terms of economics but not culture, whereas feminists understand that in a patriarchal society, assumptions regarding women’s inferiority to men become so deeply embedded that they are an unconscious part of our dominant worldview, introduced in childhood and enforced throughout life. The economic and cultural limitations under which women live their lives are often simply not noticed by men and are frequently policed by both men and women (often subconsciously, sometimes not).

One instance that may illustrate this is the incredibly misogynous jokes directed at Hillary Rodham Clinton in the 2008 presidential election. Racist comments were rightly denounced, but sexist ones didn’t evoke the same reaction. While Clinton and New York mayoral candidate Christine Quinn are neoliberal capitalist women, their treatment demonstrates that women have still not achieved the (admittedly insufficient) first stage of making people uncomfortable with openly misogynous remarks, in the same way that people often make sure to hide or disguise racial prejudice. **What does this mean for the struggle for democratic socialism?** Much as we simply cannot understand class without understanding race, so no understanding is complete without an analysis of how patriarchy intersects with capitalism. Under the continuing brutal economic assaults of exploitative capitalism, many economically disadvantaged men need to have a “lesser” that can enhance their feelings of worth in an economy and society that provides limited pathways for their success. Long-established cultural norms and the needs of the capitalist class combine to reinforce this devalued position and set expectations for woman’s role as helpmate and supporter rather than as an equal economic actor. Socialists undercut our own movement by not speaking to the needs of women, who are, after all, more thanhalf the world.

But an adequate socialist feminist analysis would move beyond simply identifying the varying levels of gender disadvantage to a more rigorous identification of how society is constructed. As feminists, we would pay attention to the underlying and unexamined expectations that shape gender-related questions such as who does caregiving, how we organize family and private life, what kind of work confers respect on the worker, etc. We would subject economic, historical and social patterns to socialist analysis and measure them against socialist ideals. Finally, we would analyze how gender intersects with other categories of identity such as race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and citizenship.

The struggle to integrate women’s experience thoroughly into socialist theory and practice and to de-emphasize male experience as *the* paradigm will not be achieved immediately.  We cannot erase thousands of years of deeply absorbed assumptions and widely distributed cultural attitudes in a few generations. We have little awareness of how ingrained and unconscious these barriers are except for when that still, small voice occasionally says in a woman’s ear “that’s not fair!”  But socialists cannot allow half of the population to be an afterthought. While DSAers discuss reproductive justice in the context of the recent surge in punitive activity, that and other feminist issues tend to trail low wages, immigration, the continuing recession, etc., as a focus of discussion, and the feminist take on each of these issues is not fully explored. This must change.

#### The future of labor is women and that entails that women are treated equally throughout the workplace, history shows us the journey that was made for moder women to be in the workforce at all

[Eileen **Boris**](https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/author/eileen-boris/)and [Annelise **Orleck**](https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/author/annelise-orleck/)[**11 FEMINISM AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT: A Century of Collaboration and Conflict (cuny.edu)**](https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2011/01/03/feminism-and-the-labor-movement-a-century-of-collaboration-and-conflict/) Eileen Boris: Hull Professor, Graduate Director, Specialization: Labor Studies, Gender, Race, Class, Women's History, Social Politics, Areas of study: gender, race, and class, feminist theory, labor studies, social politics, women, work, and welfare, women's and gender history [Eileen Boris | Department of Feminist Studies - UC Santa Barbara (ucsb.edu)](https://www.femst.ucsb.edu/people/eileen-boris).Annelise Orleck: U.S. history since 1877 /U.S. political history /U.S. women /women and American radicalism /race, ethnicity and immigration /Jewish immigration, gay and lesbian studies [Annelise Orleck | Faculty Directory (dartmouth.edu)](https://faculty-directory.dartmouth.edu/annelise-orleck).

A century after the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, women have become nearly half of the unionized labor force. They work in the growing service and public employment sectors as nurses, home attendants, teachers, and clerks. Previously labeled women’s issues—maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and work-family balance—have become union issues. Women hold leadership positions in the AFL-CIO and Change to Win. With the disappearance of manufacturing and the growth of service labor, women of color—both immigrant- and U.S.- born—have become the driving force in the labor movement for safe jobs, living wages, and dignity at work, leading women-dominated unions and worker associations. It is not an overstatement to say that the future of the labor movement appears up to the women. 1.It hasn’t always been this way. For at least a century, labor feminists have fought for the interests of wage-earning women and workingclass housewives, both within the feminist and the labor movements. Still, the priorities of the women’s movement for sex-based rights and those of the labor movement for class solidarity often diverged during the twentieth century. Working-class feminists struggled against middle-class feminists who focused primarily on achieving equality with male professionals and executives. They also battled men who sought to exclude women from unionized jobs and who denied organized women workers a full share of power in the labor movement.

Highlighting key moments when feminists and unionists came together over the last century, this essay offers a usable past drawn from the fraught—but often productive—relationship between feminism and labor. An examination of the contact between organized women’s groups and organized labor, women’s organizations within the labor movement, and feminist labor organizing shows that when feminists and unions worked together, both benefited. Labor gained when it understood women’s issues as crucial for the advancement of the working class. The women’s movement was at its strongest when its membership and agenda crossed class lines. Recognition of this history may help to revitalize feminism as much as organized labor.

Labor Feminism Before the 1960s: The Women’s Trade Union League

The years surrounding 1911’s Triangle Shirtwaist Fire saw significant and broad-based collaboration between labor activists and middle- to upper-class feminists in the United States. That period began with the creation of the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) in 1903. The League, as it was known by its members, drew together educated women reformers (mostly white, Protestant, and native-born) and young women workers (many of them immigrant Jews, Italians, and Irish) to improve factory wages, working conditions, and hours. The WTUL embodied both an unusual degree of collaboration between feminists and the labor movement, and the many tensions that arose from longstanding attempts to build lasting and productive relationships. 2.This cross-class women’s network deepened with the uprisings of young women garment workers that began in New York in 1909 and then spread over the next few years into other Eastern and Midwestern cities. Middle-class and affluent supporters of woman suffrage—including League activists, college students, and even wealthy socialites—saw these strikes as an opportunity to win working women to the cause. Forming what the press dubbed “mink brigades,” affluent supporters marched alongside young immigrant women on picket lines in a largely successful attempt to reduce high rates of police brutality. After they bailed arrested strikers out of jail, they spoke (alongside the released strikers) for woman suffrage on the steps of jails and courthouses. Affluent feminists brought working women into existing suffrage organizations, as well as offering financial support for the establishment of working-class suffrage groups. Working women understood, as Polish Jewish cap maker Rose Schneiderman explained in 1907, that they “must . . . secure political power to shape their own labor conditions.” 3.Women factory and manufacturing workers knew they needed the political and financial support of these more affluent “allies.” Nonetheless, imbalances in social power and financial resources generated much conflict in the first two decades of the century, when working-class members felt bullied, condescended to, or generally misunderstood. While many working-class women embraced socialism and anarchism, their better-off allies mostly shied away from revolutionary politics, preferring to reform the existing system. The refusal of working women to eschew more radical approaches moved affluent women to withdraw financial support from independent working women’s groups, prompting angry responses. “It is up to the working people to save themselves,” Schneiderman tongue-lashed a theater full of affluent New Yorkers after the Triangle Fire.4. In the aftermath of the fire, women labor activists and reformers redoubled efforts to win the vote, and industrial feminists (the self-name of labor feminists of that day) like Schneiderman began to focus as much on passing laws to regulate wages and labor conditions as they did on union organizing. Frances Perkins (the future U.S. Secretary of Labor under Franklin Roosevelt) of the National Consumers League and Pauline Newman (a former Triangle employee and WTUL activist) were appointed as investigators for the New York State Factory Investigating Commission (FIC), positions they used to educate powerful politicians about the conditions under which working women labored. Over the next three years, the New York FIC, and sister organizations in the other industrial states, pushed through a dramatically expanded regulatory structure for factory labor—including laws that empowered state commissioners of labor, banned the labor of children under the age of fourteen, and required inspection of elevators and fireproof devices. 5.During World War I, this collaboration between middle-class feminists, women labor activists, and Democratic Party politicians resulted in the founding of a Women in Industry Service to monitor conditions of women working on defense contracts. After the war, President Wilson established a permanent Women’s Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor to investigate women’s working conditions. Its creation marked the ascension of “industrial” and “social” feminists to federal government positions of authority, a significant move toward remaking the state as a force sympathetic to at least some of the goals of the labor movement. 6.By the 1920s, when the WTUL came to be run by labor union women—such as Schneiderman and Newman—it was genuinely a cross-class, multi-ethnic organization. Still, once U.S. women won the right to vote, relations between the self-described feminists of the National Women’s Party (NWP) and women in the labor movement frayed. In the early 1920s, NWP leaders began lobbying for an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution, which declared it unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of sex. The labor movement rejected the ERA out of fear that it would negate hard-won legislation protecting women workers. Ignoring industrial feminists’ pleas to adopt a more piecemeal approach to gender equality, the NWP introduced the ERA into every session of Congress from 1921 into the early 1970s, driving a deep and lasting wedge between the labor movement and feminist activists.

Labor opponents of the ERA gained the upper hand with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. He was, along with his wife Eleanor, a key ally of the New York WTUL. With the appointment of League leaders like Perkins and Schneiderman to key government positions, FDR signaled support for the goals of the labor-feminist alliance. Perkins oversaw the extension of wage-and-hour and safety protections for all workers, regardless of gender, through the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. These laws marked a turning point for union men who had long been ambivalent toward the idea of legislating labor conditions. No longer were strategies for improving the lives of workers so starkly divided by sex.

Still, race continued to divide the working class. The new legislation intentionally denied coverage to agricultural and domestic workers—the fields in which most women of color were employed. Many within the labor-feminist coalition pushed to expand federal laws, including the Social Security Act of 1935, to extend coverage to these occupations. They also expanded the reach of the labor movement, by supporting organizing drives among service workers, many of whom were women of color. In reaching out to black and immigrant organizers like Maida Springer Kemp, Dolly Robinson, and Charlotte Adelman, the mid-1930s WTUL brought laundry workers, waitresses, and hotel maids—who had been largely ignored by white male unionists—into the labor movement. This same period saw the mass organizing of Caribbean immigrants and Puerto Ricans in the East, and Mexican-Americans in the West. These populations had long been ignored by the male-led unions.

With the coming of World War II, largescale employment of women in defense plants moved feminist labor issues into the center of public discussion. Early in the war years, manufacturers attempted to label any new jobs in defense production as “female” work, enabling them to pay women workers less than the prevailing union wage. Labor leaders’ longstanding attempts to keep the best-paid jobs for white male union members had to be rethought, given the labor shortages resulting from the wartime draft. Reluctantly at first, more enthusiastically later, some unions—most notably the United Electrical Workers (UE)— began to resist sex-based pay differentials. Even leaders with little concern for women’s salaries worried that, if they allowed manufacturers to pay women less during the war, when men came home afterwards, it would be difficult to bring wages back up. Other unions retained sex-based pay differentials in their contracts, but in 1942 the National War Labor Board—responding to years of lobbying by labor-feminist groups like the WTUL—established a policy of equal pay for men and women performing the same jobs. The 1963 Equal Pay Act, the first time the federal government put its power behind equal pay for equal work, was the fruit of continuing labor-feminist agitation on this issue.

With wage-earning mothers constituting 36 percent of the labor force by the war’s end, work and family balance inevitably became an urgent labor issue. Joint efforts between feminists and male unionists mitigated the “double day” with publicly supported child care, flexible hours, and more convenient shopping options. Industrial unions recognized womanpower through special women’s committees; the United Automobile Workers (UAW) committee carried forward the labor-feminist agenda into the early postwar years, in collaboration with the U.S. Women’s Bureau. 7.Labor Feminism Since 1960

The 1960s and 1970s saw an explosion of interactions between feminists and trade unionists, and an energetic feminism within the labor movement. As women’s liberation activists discovered the working class—with help from World War II-era trade unionists and leftists—feminist caucuses sprung up within existing unions. At its first convention in 1974, thirty-five thousand women gathered together not “to swap recipes,” as Myra Wolfgang of HERE taunted George Meany and the rest of labor’s male leadership, but to organize the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW). Along with explicitly feminist groups like the Union Women’s Alliance to Gain Equality (Union WAGE) and 9to5, CLUW declared women’s issues to be union issues. 8.In honoring WTUL stalwart Pauline Newman at its founding meeting, CLUW recognized generational continuities among labor feminists. Its stated priorities explicitly echoed those of the WTUL: strengthening the role of women in unions; organizing unorganized women; achieving pay equity; and increasing the involvement of women in the political and legislative process. But CLUW added goals that reflected changing times—promoting affirmative action for women in the workplace, addressing the concerns of aging women workers, and tackling substance abuse. In 1980, CLUW president Joyce Miller became the first woman on the AFL-CIO’s executive board—a modest and long-overdue recognition of the significance of women in the labor movement.

Trade union feminists helped launch a revitalized women’s movement that sparked new demands for women’s rights at home, on the job, and within unions. Clericals, flight attendants, and domestic workers contested the dominant assumption within the AFL-CIO that women workers were unorganizable. **Collective action** hit pink-collar occupations. This trend was exemplified by the formation of Stewardesses for Women’s Rights, the Willmar Bank Employees’ Association strike in 1977, and the highly creative and flexible campaign to organize Harvard’s clerical and technical workers. Independent women’s associations, like Chicago’s Women Employed, were far more likely to initiate such efforts than were traditional labor unions. At a time when most unions still concentrated on manufacturing, feminists argued for both the economic value of women’s unpaid labor in the home and the worth of women’s work in service industries. They anticipated the strategies needed to organize the future economy. 9.At the same time, trade union women shaped the new feminism in two ways. First, they complicated the meaning of equality by bringing to the feminist agenda issues like child care and flextime that women needed to balance wage-earning with family life. By the 1970s, labor feminists went beyond an anti-discrimination program to insist that women’s rights at work included pregnancy leave and other labor standards, and that these issues mattered to the labor movement even if they did not apply to men. The World War II efforts of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) laid the basis for feminist organizing in the 1970s that culminated in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. In 1982, twenty thousand Chinese-immigrant garment workers forced union-sponsored day care onto the agenda of the labor movement by leaving their babies on the desk of previously unresponsive garment union president Jay Mazur. 10.Second, they had an institutional impact. Not only would longtime union activists, like Stella Nowicki from Chicago’s stockyards, become involved with women’s liberation— they also helped birth its most national manifestation. In 1966, Caroline Davis and Dorothy Haener from the UAW’s Women’s Department became key founders of the National Organization for Women (NOW), providing office space and clerical services to that fledging organization. NOW’s co-founder and most famous leader, Betty Friedan, had learned to organize in the UE. 11.UAW women were in the forefront of shifting labor’s stand toward the ERA. Like other women in male-dominated or mixedsex industries—and unlike allies in the U.S. Women’s Bureau—they viewed women’s labor laws not as protective devices but as tools of both management and hostile male workers who sought to limit women’s opportunities and pay. They applauded the striking down of sex-based labor restrictions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, achieved through the cooperation of labor and feminist legislators. 12.In the years that followed, many local groups bridged the gaps between trade unionism and the women’s movement. 13.In California’s Bay Area, two activists rooted in the old left—Jean Maddox of the militant Local 29 of the Office and Professional Employees International Union and Ann Draper of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union— established Union WAGE in 1971. They aimed to counter NOW’s neglect of working women and support organizing through rank-and-file movements and independent associations. The larger women’s movement, in turn, influenced WAGE, which fought for reproductive rights, struggled against sexual harassment and racism, and condemned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, age, and disability.14

Citywide clerical associations, along with workplace-based women’s caucuses, more typically represented the collective action inspired by feminist and other radical insurgencies against the AFL-CIO.15 In the early 1970s, 9to5 expanded from a consciousness-raising group among Harvard clerical workers to become (first) an organization of Boston clerical workers, then part of the National Association of Working Women. In 1975, it created a companion union—Local 9to5—that was affiliated with the SEIU. Under the banner “Raises not Roses,” clerical women petitioned, picketed, sued, and engaged in creative street actions. In the 1990s, founder Karen Nussbaum brought a feminist perspective to her tenure as director of the U.S. Women’s Bureau and, in 1996, as the head of the AFL-CIO’s new Working Women’s Department.16

Feminists also established caucuses within established unions. Among the most effective, the District 31 (based in Northwest Indiana’s Calumet Region) Women’s Caucus of the United Steelworkers mobilized “burly” men to march for the ERA in Illinois, a major industrial state resisting ratification. It joined with a multiracial coalition of Chicago-area women’s groups to fight against job discrimination and violence against women and for abortion rights. It also defended women’s jobs during layoffs.17

In the early 1970s, black feminist leaders Shirley Chisholm and Eleanor Holmes Norton sought to jointly mobilize the civil rights, labor, and women’s movements to improve the conditions of domestic service. While the AFL-CIO still could not imagine organizing such workers, its members joined a cross-class and multiracial mix of feminists in supporting the 1974 expansion of the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover domestic workers. With the support of the National Committee on Household Employment, a black feminist organization initially founded by labor feminists, domestic workers themselves mobilized as the Household Technicians of America (HTA) in 1972. Given the stigma associated with domestic service, local groups across the nation sought not only traditional bread-and-butter improvements but also respect for their work and humanity through written contracts, public recognition ceremonies, and training and education programs.18

Las Vegas became a surprising base for labor feminism when a multiracial workforce of hotel maids turned the city’s Hotel and Culinary Workers Union Local 226 into the largest private union local in the United States in the 1990s. Beginning in the 1940s, AfricanAmerican women assumed leadership roles. In the 1950s, under pioneering business agent Sara Hughes, black women who labored as “back of the house” workers in the city’s hotels and casinos became organized. But, twenty years later, African-American workers contested the union’s collaboration with hotel management to segregate them into the lowest wage positions in the hotel workforce. A series of protests and court challenges yielded a federal consent decree forcing the union and Las Vegas hotels to train and place women and workers of color into higher-paid jobs. In the late 1980s, the union’s multiracial membership ratified some of the best contracts in the nation for service workers. This period of success for unionized women of color culminated in 1990 when Hattie Canty—a black migrant mother of ten—became president of the Culinary Union.19

Toward the Future

The relationship between the women’s movement and organized labor has shifted over the last twenty-five years. The AFL-CIO has incorporated major concerns of wage-earning women into its formal agenda, calling for: equal pay, work and family balance, and prevention of violence against women in the workplace. Middle-class feminists played a role in pushing unions to recognize these concerns, but too often they ignored how class structures the outcome of gender inequality, as in questions of remuneration, time flexibility, and the double day. While feminists of all classes easily embraced equal pay, middleclass people are less active in seeking redress for underpaid caregivers. Jamaican immigrant Evelyn Coke—the Long Island home care worker whose exclusion from the minimum wage law the SEIU litigated—garnered meager feminist support for her plight. On the other hand, feminists gave crucial support to new formations—like Domestic Workers United in New York City and other ethnically-based associations—that seek dignity and recognition as well as better working conditions. These efforts culminated in September 2010 when New York became the first state to adopt a Domestic Worker Bill of Rights.20

Most significantly, women have become the new face of labor, composing the majority of union recruits. As manufacturing declined and the service economy exploded, immigrant women in low-wage jobs brought a new vitality and militancy to unionization. The numbers of jobs in teaching, nursing, and clerical work that employed more women than men continued to grow right up to the beginnings of the current recession, increasing women’s percentage of the unionized workforce. In service industries, women now make up half of all unionists. Their numbers have begun to close the overall membership gap.21

While unions once saw women as unorganizable, today they count on them. Examples range across the labor force, but concentrate in the health care sector. Most of the seventy-four thousand Los Angeles home aides who voted to join the SEIU in 1999 were women. The 150,000-strong National Nurses United, formed in 2009 from three nurses groups, became the nation’s largest union of medical professionals.22 Though the numbers of women in leadership positions are nowhere near parity, Mary Kay Henry replaced Andy Stern as the head of the SEIU in 2010. Linda Chavez-Thompson served as executive vice-president of the AFL-CIO for over a decade, and then was replaced by another AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) leader, Arlene Holt Baker. And, in 2009, Liz Shuler of the IUE became the first woman elected as the federation’s secretary-treasurer.

Women of color—many of them immigrants—have spearheaded fights against today’s sweatshops in the fields and in homes, and have organized workers in food processing and garment production. They have revived hotel worker militancy, as evidenced by HERE’s ongoing Hotel Workers Rising initiative and Boston chambermaids’ protest against the Hyatt chain.23 Joined by middle-class feminist allies—some of whom were from the same ethnic group (as with Asian Immigrant Women Advocates)—they are addressing workplace conditions and occupational safety issues that represent today’s equivalent to the hazards of a century ago, including carpel tunnel injuries and industrial fires. In the 1990s, Mexicana farm workers of Líderes Campesinas investigated the impact of pesticides on pregnancy and highlighted sexual harassment as well as the continued low wages paid for work in California’s fields.24 Worker centers—like the Garment Worker Center in Los Angeles and many others—are linking feminism, immigrant rights, and worker justice on a daily basis in working-class communities.25

A century ago, the Triangle Fire horrified New York City and the nation as a whole, forcing the labor movement, feminists, and political reformers to more systematically address the murderous conditions facing American workers. Over the years, feminists and trade unionists came together in numerous ways, engaging in vibrant coalitions that enabled them to transcend their differences. Today’s labor movement has become, in large measure, a women’s movement. Whether it will stay that way remains to be seen. Is the feminization of the labor movement yet another indicator of its decline? Or is it a harbinger of labor’s renewal? One hundred years after Triangle that question remains unresolved. One thing is certain: the future strength of the labor movement depends on its women, and the future of feminism will continue to be shaped by labor.

# \*\*\*AFF – at: Fem IR

## PDB – socialism aff

#### Radical feminism and socialism both agree women are oppressed by capitalist society. The ultimate goal for feminism is to embrace socialism.

**Aschoff 18- (**Nicole, PhD in sociology, senior editor for Verso Book, *Feminism Againist Capitalism,* Publisher: JACOBIN)

So while itis certainly necessary to recognize how gendered contemporary society remains, it is also necessary to be clear-eyed about how to overcome these divides and, equally important,to recognize the limitations of a feminism that **doesn’t challenge capitalism.**

**Capital feeds on existing norms of sexism, compounding the exploitative nature of wage work.** When women’s ambitions and desires are silenced or undervalued,they are easier to take advantage of. Sexism is part of the company toolkit, enabling firms to pay women less— particularly women of color— and otherwise discriminate against them.

But even if we root out sexism,the inherent contradictions of capitalism will persist. It is important and necessary that women step into positions of power, but this won’t change the fundamental divide between workers and owners— between women at the top and women at the bottom.

It won’t change the fact that most women find themselves in precarious, low-wage jobs that present a far greater barrier to advancement and a comfortable life than sexism in the economic or political sphere. It won’t change the power of the profit motive and the compulsion of companies to give workers as little as economic, social, and cultural norms will allow.

 Of course, society is not reducible to the wage relation, and gender divides are real and persistent. Taking class seriously means anchoring the oppression of women within the material conditions in which they live and work while recognizing the role of sexism in shaping both women’s work life and their home life.

The feminist movement— both its “social-welfare” incarnation and its radical contemporary— has made significant gains. The challenge now is twofold:to defend these hard-won victories and make it possible for all women to actually enjoy them, and to push forward with new, concrete demands that address the complex relationship between sexism and profit-making.

There is no simple answer to how to accomplish these twin goals. In the past, women have made the biggest gains by fighting for both women’s rights and workers’ rights simultaneously— linking the fight against sexism to the fight against capital.

As Eileen Boris and Anelise Orleck argue, during the 1970s and ’80s, “trade union feminists helped launch a revitalized women’s movementthat sparked new demands for women’s rights at home, on the job, and within unions.” Airline stewardesses, garment workers, clericals, and domestic workers challenged the male-dominated trade union movement(a woman didn’t sit on the AFL-CIO executive board until 1980) and in the process forged a new, more expansive feminism.

Trade union women created a new field of possibility by demanding not only higher wages and equal opportunity but also child care, flexible work schedules, pregnancy leave, and other gains usually overlooked or undervalued by their union brothers.

This is the direction that both socialists and feminists should be orienting themselves— toward struggles and demands that challenge both the drives of capital and the ingrained norms of sexism that are so deeply rooted under capitalism.

 Struggles and demands that achieve this are concrete and are currently being fought for. For example,the struggle for single-payer healthcare— which would provide healthcare as a right to every person from cradle to grave regardless of their ability to pay— is a demand that undermines both sexism and the power of capital to control and repress worker agency. There are many other concrete short-term demands that blend the goals of feminism and socialism as well, including free higher education, free child care, and a universal basic income combined with a robust social safety net.

 These reforms would lay the groundwork for more radical goals that would go far in rooting out sexism, exploitation, and the commodification of social life. For example, projects to increase collective, democratic control over institutions central to our home, school, and work lives— schools, banks, workplaces, city governments, and state and local agencies—would give all women and men more power, autonomy, and the possibility for a better life.

This anticapitalist strategy is one that contains the possibility for the radical change that women need.

**Ultimately the goals of a radical feminism and socialism are the same— justice and equality for all people, not simply equal opportunity for women or equal participation by women in an unjust system.**